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ORGANIZATION AND OPERATIONS OF THE  
EAST GERMAN STATE SECURITY SERVICE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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S U M M A R Y O F C O N T E N T S

Organization and Operations of the  
East German State Security Service

This report presents information on the East German State Security Service (Staatssicherheitsdienst) as contained in a monograph, entitled Berlin-Lichtenberg, Normannenstrasse 22 (Agentenzenrale SSD), by Peter Herz and published by the Investigations Committee of Free Jurists in Berlin-Zehlendorf in May 1960. The monograph was issued through the German branch of the International Committee for Information and Social Activity in Bonn, Federal Republic of Germany. Organizational charts of the Ministry of State Security and the Main Administration for Intelligence in the original document were not reproduced because the information contained in them appears in greater detail elsewhere in the text.

Pages 1 through 48



ORGANIZATION AND OPERATIONS OF THE EAST GERMAN STATE SECURITY SERVICE

Table of Contents

|   | <u>Page</u> |
|---|-------------|
| I. Introduction   | 1           |
| II. Composition of Ministry of State Security   | 2           |
| III. Composition of the Main Administration for Intelligence                          | 4           |
| IV. Missions of Individual Departments of the Ministry of State Security              | 5           |
| A. Main Administration for Intelligence (HVA)   | 5           |
| B. Main Department II   | 6           |
| C. Technical Main Departments   | 6           |
| D. Main Department VIII   | 7           |
| V. Other Intelligence Services in East Berlin and Their Auxiliary Organizations       | 7           |
| A. Soviet Zone  | 7           |
| B. Soviet Union   | 7           |
| C. Poland   | 8           |
| D. Czechoslovakia   | 8           |
| E. Hungary  | 8           |
| F. Rumania  | 8           |
| G. Bulgaria   | 8           |
| VI. Methods of Operation of the Ministry of State Security                            | 9           |
| A. Recruitment  | 9           |
| B. Examples   | 10          |
| VII. Criminals as Collaborators of the State Security Service                         | 27          |
| VIII. Extracts From Cases Related by Former Members of the Ministry of State Security | 28          |
| A. Lieutenant Helmut Fleischer  | 28          |
| B. Lieutenant Gunter Gebauer  | 32          |
| C. Interrogator in Chemnitz   | 35          |

ORGANIZATION AND OPERATIONS OF THE EAST GERMAN STATE SECURITY SERVICE

|   | Page |
|---|------|
| IX. Agitation and Propaganda  | 38   |
| X. An FDJ Secretary and the State Security Service                                    | 41   |
| XI. Recruiting of Agents With Deceptive Material                                      | 42   |
| XII. Examples From the Work of the Soviet Intelligence Service                        | 43   |
| A. A 36-Year-Old Person and His Fate  | 43   |
| B. Industrial Espionage   | 44   |
| XIII. Events "Under the Care" of the State Security Service                           | 46   |
| Appendix  | 47   |
| Glossary of Some Principal Terms  |      |
| Abbreviations   | 47   |
| A. Soviet Zone  |      |
| B. Soviet Union   |      |
| C. Poland   |      |
| D. Czechoslovakia   |      |
| E. Hungary  |      |
| F. Rumania  |      |
| G. Bulgaria   |      |
| VI. Methods of Operation of the Ministry of State Security                            |      |
| A. Recruitment  |      |
| B. Examples   |      |
| VII. Criminals as Collaborators of the State Security Service                         |      |
| VIII. Extracts from Cases Related by Former Members of the Ministry of State Security |      |
| A. Lieutenant Helmut Pfelecher  |      |
| B. Lieutenant Gunter Gebauer  |      |
| C. Interrogator in Chemnitz   |      |



## I. INTRODUCTION

The visitor to East Berlin will rarely be shown a large building at No 22 Normannenstrasse in Lichtenberg by the Communist officials whom he has selected as his hosts or who have imposed themselves upon him. Although the building boasts the most modern office equipment in the eastern sector, the most interesting laboratories, and the most extensive social facilities for its "occupants," it is not among the sight-seeing attractions of the part of the German capital city under Communist control. Western visitors who have previously familiarized themselves with conditions in the so-called GDR will, nevertheless attempt to obtain an impression from this building. They will observe the controls imposed at the main entrance and perhaps will study the industrious traffic there for a few minutes. A longer stay would be dangerous; the taking of a photograph is not recommended, and a legitimate visit to the building is virtually impossible since the SSD (Staatssicherheitsdienst, State Security Service) of the "German Democratic Republic" does not like visitors or guests -- only "objects."

This building on Normannenstrasse employs almost 3,000 persons; they work in virtually all walks of life in the GDR and in the Federal Republic of Germany; they control one of the largest agent nets in the world, and they see to it -- through daily "operations" -- that East Berlin does not lose its reputation as an agitation and subversive headquarters, as an agent center.

In the following pages, an attempt will be made to present the activities of the Ministry of State Security on the basis of examples. The material is based on RIAS radio broadcasts from Berlin in January, February, and March 1960, as well as on court sentences of the Federal Republic of Germany, testimony of refugees, and police reports, with the names of persons and places having been partially altered.

The cases which are related were selected so as to clearly show the methods of the SSD and its various auxiliary organizations and to provide everyone who maintains relations with the Soviet Zone for any reason whatsoever with an insight into the background of some of the "contact efforts" from the East.

The author and publisher do not claim that this brochure is complete and conclusively registers all aspects of the activities of the SSD. In view of the continuing agent and subversive activity originating in East Berlin, this is impossible. Only an attempt can be made to strike a type of intermediate balance which, because of the Soviet and Soviet-Zone criticism of the West, can be of particular value.



## II. COMPOSITION OF MINISTRY OF STATE SECURITY

The Soviet sector of Berlin is the deciding operations base of the Soviet zone espionage services in their battle against West Berlin, the Federal Republic of Germany, and Western Europe. The Ministry of State Security, in its 10 years of duration, has become the largest espionage and surveillance apparatus. The most capable and best-trained collaborators of this service, which was primarily a surveillance service for use within the GDR, were unified toward the end of 1953. Today, they form the cadre of the foreign espionage service in the Ministry of State Security within the "Main Administration for Intelligence" (Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung).

Since 1 November 1957 and succeeding Ernst Wollweber, the chief of the Ministry of State Security has been Col Gen Erich Mielke, who, as chief of the Operations Department of the Ministry of State Security and First Deputy Minister of State Security, has been responsible for the expansion and extension of the SSD for many years. Mielke's deputies are Lt Gen Otto Last, Maj Gen Otto Walter, and Maj Gen Markus Wolf.

The ministry has 16 Bezirk administrations which control more than 220 Kreis offices. The ministry controls approximately 14,000 collaborators. The 12 main departments and 14 departments of the ministry are partially housed at No 22 Normannenstrasse in Berlin-Lichtenberg and partially in other quarters of the Soviet sector of Berlin. The following are the main departments and other components:

Main Administration for Intelligence (HYA) (active intelligence collection)  
Berlin-Lichtenberg, Normannenstrasse 22;  
Chief: Maj Gen Markus Wolf.

Main Department I (security of the East German armed forces)  
Berlin-Niederschoneweide, Schnellerstrasse;  
Chief: Col Karl Kleinjung.

Main Department II (counterespionage)  
Berlin-Lichtenberg, Normannenstrasse 22, main building;  
Chief: Col Josef Kiefel.

Main Department III (security of light industry, trade, and agriculture)  
Berlin-Lichtenberg, Normannenstrasse 22;  
Chief: Col Artur Hoffmann.



Main Department V (underground movements, surveillance of parties and mass organizations)

Berlin-Lichtenberg, Normannenstrasse 22.

Main Department VI (security of the armaments and heavy industry)  
Chief: Eduard Switalla.

Department VII (protection for the Main Administration of the German people's police -- HVDVP)

Berlin-Karlshorst, Treskowallee;

Chief: Lt Col Robert Schindler.

Main Department VIII (surveillance, interrogation, and arrest)

Berlin-Karlshorst, Treskowallee;

Chief: Col Rudolf Gutsche

Main Department IX (investigations)

Berlin-Lichtenberg, Magdalenenstrasse;

Chief: Lt Col Rudolf Gebhardt

Department X (criminal technology)

Department XI (cryptography)

Berlin-Karlshorst, Treskowallee;

Chief: Major Koppler

Main Department XII (records and statistics)

Berlin-Lichtenberg, Normannenstrasse 22;

Chief: Lt Col Paul Karoos

Main Department XIII (security of transportation)

Berlin-Lichtenberg, Normannenstrasse 22;

Chief: Col Artur Paczinski

Main Department XIV (prisons)

Berlin-Hohenschonhausen, Freienwalder Strasse, 9-12;

Chief: Col Paul Rumpelt

Main Department Kader and Training (KuS)

Berlin-Lichtenberg, Normannenstrasse 22;

Chief: Col Richard Wichert

Department M (postal surveillance)

Berlin-Lichtenberg, Normannenstrasse 22;

Chief: Colonel Schlewicke

Main Department S (development and fabrication of technical materials)



Department R (application of technical materials)

Department for Personal Protection (PS)  
Berlin-Niederschoneweide, Schnellerstrasse;

Chief: Col Franz Gold

Information

Berlin-Lichtenberg, Normannenstrasse 22;

Chief: Maj Gerhard Kehl

Department for Administration and Economy (VvW)

Berlin-Karlshorst, Treskowallee;

Chief: Col Walter Mundt

General Department

Department for Radio Operations

Berlin-Lichtenberg, Normannenstrasse 22, and Berlin-Grunau;

Chief: Lt Col Georg Zimmermann

Department for Motor Vehicle Operation

Berlin-Hohenschonhausen, Freienwalder Stasse, 9-12;

Chief: Maj Rudi Weber

Finance Department

Construction Department

Department for Intelligence and Weapons

Department O (clandestine surveillance)

Berlin-Johannisthal, Gross-Berliner Damm;

Chief: Maj Adolf Viehmann

### III. COMPOSITION OF THE MAIN ADMINISTRATION FOR INTELLIGENCE

Department 1 -- Political espionage and subversion; mission: federal government, Bundestag, and security group.

Department 2 -- Political espionage and subversion; mission: party leaders, Bundestag factions, German Trade Union Organization, Central Committee of German Catholics.

Department 3 -- Military espionage and subversion; mission: foreign embassies, military missions, establishment of intelligence support points in neutral foreign countries and in Western Europe.



Department 4 -- Military espionage and subversion; mission: NATO headquarters in Paris, NATO staffs in the Federal Republic of Germany, military installations.

Department 5 -- Economic and scientific espionage; mission: professional associations, enterprises, and research centers.

Department 6 -- Rat line operations; mission: ratlining of agents for all purposes to all countries and from thence, in a concentrated manner, into West Germany.

Department 7 -- Evaluation; mission: issuance of covert and overt information for purposes of subversion.

Department 8 -- Diversion; mission: preparations for X-day, all manner of sabotage, blowing things up.

Department 9 -- Communications; mission: photo technology, agent radio, availability of communications media, radio room.

Department K -- Forgeries; mission: preparation of documents, identity cards, and official seals.

Department R -- Card File and Registry.

K and S Office -- Cadre and training; mission: personnel matters and training.

HVA university -- Executive training program.

#### IV. MISSIONS OF INDIVIDUAL DEPARTMENTS OF THE MINISTRY OF STATE SECURITY

##### A. Main Administration for Intelligence (HVA)

The HVA (Main Administration for Intelligence) is directly subordinate to the Minister of State Security. It is charged with infiltrating ministries and offices of the Federal Republic of Germany and of the other West European countries, as selected by the Ministry of State Security or the Politburo of the SED (Socialist Unity Party of Germany), in order to be in a position to collect secret political orders of "governments hostile to the GDR," as well as other information. The principal emphasis in this activity is undoubtedly aimed at the institutions of the Federal Republic of Germany. Other operations are aimed against the installations of other NATO powers, as well as against the neutral countries of Europe. The HVA



has charged special departments with the surveillance and observation of political parties and organizations in the federal republic. These departments are to seek out suitable circumstances within parties and organizations in preparation for the establishment of intelligence contacts or for the installation of persons for purposes of political subversion. In this work, the HVA turns primarily to persons who, in one or another matter, have permitted themselves to be recognized as being in political or ideological agreement with the goals of SED policy (see extracts from conversation with former HVA officer, presented later in this report).

The HVA controls both so-called residencies and individual contacts in the federal republic. In many cases, radio contact is used as a means of communication. HVA agents are mostly carefully trained according to a two-part plan. First, they receive their basic intelligence education for general intelligence use and, second, a special education in which they become familiar with their area of operation and the necessary technical apparatus.

In addition, the HVA engages in psychological warfare aimed at the Federal Republic of Germany and the Western powers. It attempts to spread disunity among the Western allies, to confuse the population through threats and interference, and to provide Western intelligence services with doctored information, and it sponsors the dissemination and production of libelous information within the federal republic.

#### B. Main Department II

This department is charged with the penetration of Western intelligence services to obtain information on their organization, personnel composition, and missions. It is responsible for the overwhelming part of the counterespionage contacts of the ministry. In collaboration with its counterpart departments at the Bezirk administration levels, the department dispatches a large number of agents to West Berlin and to the federal republic. For the most part, these agents are instructed to execute only observations, but probably also have missions of testing and tying up Western counterespionage capacity.

#### C. Technical Main Departments

The technical main departments support the operational part of the Ministry of State Security in its work. Their workshops in Berlin-Hohenschonhausen engage in the production of all the necessary intelligence service hardware. Thus, for example, the High Frequency Department developed miniature microphones with a diameter of only 8 millimeters.



These microphones are installed clandestinely and hooked up to miniature tape recorders. The ministry frequently uses interior upholstery of vehicles, hollowed-out legs of furniture, and electric wiring connector boxes as favored places of concealment (see discussion of the installation of a monitoring device in the office of the Land Bishop of Saxony elsewhere in this report).

The Chemical Department has developed special secret writing inks and tracing procedures with which agents of the Ministry of State Security are equipped. Other components of this department are engaged in the construction of "caches" for the transportation of intelligence materials.

#### D. Main Department VIII

This department is subordinate to the Ministry of State Security and acts as an executive organ. Upon request of all operational departments, Main Department VIII conducts observations, as well as interrogations and arrests.

### V. OTHER INTELLIGENCE SERVICES IN EAST BERLIN AND THEIR AUXILIARY ORGANIZATIONS

#### A. Soviet Zone

In addition to the Ministry of State Security, the GDR has the administration for Coordination of the National People's Army, which controls the military espionage service. This administration has the mission of collecting military, military-political, and armaments-technical information in the West, not being limited to the Federal Republic of Germany. It is divided into three operational main departments and employs approximately 400 persons.

#### B. Soviet Union

Both the Committee for State Security of the Council of Ministers of the USSR and the Main Administration for Investigations of the General Staff of the Soviet Ministry of Defense operate out of East Berlin. They maintain several contact points in East Berlin, including operational departments which direct agents by radio. In addition, it should be assumed that the Soviet commercial representative offices in East Berlin, as well as those in the Federal Republic of Germany, are engaged in intelligence activities.



C. Poland

The Polish Embassy in East Berlin utilizes secret apartments in various areas of the Soviet zone to shelter agents coming from the West. A part of the leading personnel of the Polish espionage service can be reached through the official telephone switchboard of the Polish Embassy, as has been shown in several West German trials.

D. Czechoslovakia

The Czechoslovak Embassy in Berlin, N54, the office of the Czechoslovak Commercial Counsel in Berlin, W8, and the House of Czechoslovak Culture, also in Berlin W8, have been named as contact points for agents in the various trials of agents of the Czechoslovak secret service in West Germany.

E. Hungary

The Hungarian Embassy in Berlin-Trepeow permits the Hungarian State Security Service to use its rooms and to maintain a secret office. Furthermore, the Hungarian Committee for Sponsoring the Return to the Homeland, which is located in East Berlin, has been shown to be a contact place for the Hungarian Intelligence Service.

F. Rumania

The Rumanian foreign espionage service maintains an office in the Rumanian Embassy in Berlin-Pankow which, during trials in West Germany, has several times been named as a contact place for agents. Similarly, the Repatriation Committee has allegedly worked for the Rumanian State Security Service.

G. Bulgaria

In the same manner as the other East Bloc Nations, Bulgaria uses her East Berlin Embassy in Pankow and her commercial offices in Berlin, W8, as support points for foreign espionage aimed against the West. On the basis of one specific trial, there were indications that the espionage department of the Bulgarian Embassy in East Berlin maintains contacts with persons who cooperate with the Bulgarian commercial office in Frankfurt Main.



## VI. METHODS OF OPERATION OF THE MINISTRY OF STATE SECURITY

### A. Recruitment

#### 1. Method 1 -- Based on Economic Situation

The SSD contacts persons who it knows or suspects are in economic difficulty, live beyond their means, or, for any reason, are interested in supplementing their income and do not ask from where the money comes. Before such persons are given assignments, it is possible for them to be contacted on a business basis with the assistance of the state trade organs of the Soviet zone. It is absolutely normal for collaborators of the SSD to infiltrate foreign trade organizations of East Germany and to act as representatives in business transactions (Leipzig Trade Fair).

#### 2. Method 2 -- Based on Compromise

The SSD initiates surveillance of persons in West Berlin in whom it is interested, through intermediaries, in order to learn their weaknesses. After months and sometimes years of observation, an attempt is made to maneuver the person into compromising situations or relationships. In this regard, assistance is primarily obtained from prostitutes of both sexes, alcohol, so-called "cavalier violations" [unexplained], or unknown details from the political past of the subject person which might be of interest to the SSD. For these purposes, the service constantly recruits collaborators among homosexuals and prostitutes, who are then prepared for their assignments in the Soviet sector in so-called short courses and equipped with technical materials such as miniature cameras and tape recorders.

#### 3. Method 3 -- Based on Ideological Agreement

The Ministry of State Security, particularly the HVA (Main Administration for Intelligence), observes persons who, in individual questions or in their political bearing, tend to deviate from the policy of the parties or organizations of which they are members. Within the Soviet Zone, specific persons, either from the ranks of the official members of the SSD or so-called secret informants who have been placed under pressure, are selected and instructed to approach the person under observation and pretend to be of the same political persuasion so that,



as a beginning, and on the basis of this "agreement," a friendship can be constituted. Following several innocuous conversations and a similarly innocuous exchange of correspondence, the Eastern contact person will reveal himself and, as a rule, will require the person who is living in the West under surveillance to execute acts of political espionage for the HVA. A rare phenomenon in recruiting on the basis of ideological agreement is the presence of a common Communist viewpoint. In the case of such persons, no "pretext" is used: the cards are immediately laid on the table. It is primarily in the trade unions and in the socialist organizations of West Germany that the SSD collaborators seek persons who permit themselves to be recruited on a common ideological basis of Marxism and Leninism.

4. Method 4 -- Based on False Information and Reports

In this type of action, persons who have relatives living in the Soviet Zone of Germany or in the Soviet sector of Berlin are approached. They are told that their relatives are sick or had an accident, or the relatives are even forced to request a visit from the resident of the Federal Republic of Germany or West Berlin. In such cases, there are no difficulties involved in the issuance of a pass.

B. EXAMPLES

(Name of places and persons, as well as times, have been partially altered).

1. Party Secretary on the Wrong Track

In 1951, a certain B was elected party secretary of the SPD (Social Democratic Party of Germany) in one district of East Berlin. He was oriented, as one might say, considerably far to the left; he had some personal difficulties, left his first wife, left everything to her, and lived with a girl friend. He did not want to marry again since he considered wives to be -- as he once expressed it -- "legally-sanctioned prostitutes." Finally, however, social conditions forced him to marry for the second time. This took place in 1954. News of his personal difficulties and his extremely leftist views became known at the SED Kreis headquarters of his East Berlin home district. Shortly after his marriage, he was visited by members of the SED, led by Kreis Secretary Heinz Lutz. A long conversation ensued, during which B was



asked to pay a return visit. It was arranged for the meeting to take place in Lutz's apartment. It included political conversations, and B was persuaded to express his full approval of the basic policies of the SED. This took place in the presence of Alfred Neumann, who at that time was First Secretary of the Berlin headquarters of the SED presidium.

The SED members referred to Social Democrat B as a political friend, but advised him to stay with his party in order to "engage in useful work for the cause of the working class" from that vantage point. In this conversation, social democrat B gave a political debtor's oath. Now he was in the hands of the SED, which "passed him on" to the SSD. His first missions concerned the Kreis in which he was active for the social democratic party. He was expected to report on personal and political events and was engaged in setting up SED publications, designed for social democrats, in the "proper style." Prior to the Kreis elections of 1957, B was called to Bonn by his party chief. He was supposed to do some electioneering work there. He remained in contact with East Berlin. The SED official and contact man Lutz was followed by contact man "Heinz," who was later relieved by a "Hans" from the SSD. In all probability, Heinz and Hans were collaborators of the HVA SPD office. B was given money for his collaboration, and the SSD also financed recreational trips for him, among other items.

On 16 April 1958, B was employed as SPD secretary for the Middle Rhein region in Kreis Monschau, Julich, Duren, and Schleyden. He had applied for this position in order to get away from Berlin. It was also obvious that, in April 1958, he wished to terminate his relationship with the SSD. Nevertheless, the SSD placed him under pressure and demanded that he continue to collaborate. He agreed. He was given an East Berlin cover address: Arnold Knauer, Berlin-Oberschoneweide, Goethestrasse, No 36. He was instructed to write to that address when he wanted to come to Berlin. He was told that "upon arrival in Berlin, you must dial telephone number 552719 and ask for extension 2207." He frequently availed himself of the opportunity to travel to Berlin and met regularly with Hans at a restaurant on Alexanderplatz. Hans took him to a villa at the disposal of the SSD, located in an East Berlin suburb. Once there, B was relieved of the material he had brought with him, political conversations took place, new assignments were given, and "technical details" were discussed. B was instructed in the use of contact paper, in the installation of letter drops for the transmittal of intelligence reports in fences, tree trunks, walls, or cemeteries, and in monitoring of short-wave radio transmissions.



He was given the assignment to observe some of the collaborators of the SPD presidium in Bonn and to find out if they could be recruited for intelligence work in behalf of the GDR. In addition, he was told to photograph party documents with a special camera placed at his disposal and to deposit the film in a dead letter drop along the highway from Duren to Kreuznau. B was instructed to use chewing gum to attach original documents and reports executed on contact paper under the seat in a certain compartment of the interzonal train from Cologne to Berlin. In addition, during one of his visits to Berlin, B was told that he would have to prepare himself for visits by contact persons who would announce their arrival by radio. One such meeting took place in Euskirchen. Thereafter, B was arrested by Federal authorities.

He was only able to relay second-rate information to his case officer in East Berlin regarding events and developments. No significant damage was caused by his actions. However, this was not the intention of the SSD. B had obviously been scheduled to become a central figure in a net of agents which the SSD had wanted to establish within the SPD. This intention is borne out by the fact that during one conversation which B held in Berlin, Heinz advised him to request a transfer to SPD party headquarters in Bonn.

## 2. Ambitious Inventor

A 50-year-old mechanic operates a small workshop in Kassel, which was brought to their marriage by his second wife. In addition, he is active as an inventor. His life story is lively. He attempted to find himself in six different professions; he has a police record because prior to 1933 he attempted to counterfeit 5 mark coins and was sent to a concentration camp on 20 November 1933 as a dangerous habitual criminal who was also a Communist Party sympathizer. He stayed in the concentration camp until 11 April 1938, acting as a foreman on several construction gangs. He knew how to create advantages for himself through clever actions, but did not use these advantages for his own purposes; rather, he "shared them with his fellow prisoners." For example, he supported Social Democrat Carlo Mierendorf, among others. On 12 August 1942, the mechanic was again sent to the concentration camp for illegally supporting Polish workers. He lost his teeth due to rough handling and contracted angina pectoris. After the war, he started out as a scrap dealer; later, he became a machinist; and finally, as mentioned above, he is the owner of a small workshop.



Apart from his current activity in behalf of several large enterprises of the city of Kassel, the mechanic designed a nylon water spigot and a water siphoning device. He was given a federal patent for the siphoning device, and a registered design protection certificate was issued for his water faucet. The use of his applications in the federal republic met with considerable difficulty. He was finally successful in selling the production rights for his siphoning device, making a profit of 2,000 DM-West.

The difficulties which the mechanic was experiencing in finding useful application for his inventions were relayed by an unidentified middleman to the SSD. On 10 February 1955, the mechanic was visited in Kassel by a man who introduced himself as "Ritter" and stated that he had arrived upon the request of the DIA for Chemistry (Intra-German and Foreign Trade Enterprise) in order to negotiate the transfer of production rights for the nylon water faucet. Actually, Ritter was an agent of the Ministry of State Security who was under orders to obtain planning and production information pertaining to several enterprises in the federal republic and to provide appropriate technical documentation regarding their equipment and facilities. However, at first, this remained hidden from the mechanic. Since the mechanic did not have a sample of his water faucet on hand, he agreed with Ritter that he would travel to the Leipzig Trade Fair at the expense of the DIA for Chemistry (March 1955) and would bring samples of his two inventions with him. He arrived in Leipzig, sought out the booth of the DIA for Chemistry, as he had been told to do by letter, met with Ritter, and was introduced to two other "representatives" of the foreign trade organization. He was told that his designs would have to be tested and that he would receive word in this regard. After several weeks, he was asked to come to the DIA for Chemistry in East Berlin. Once there, Ritter and Ritter's superiors told him that the testing of his inventions had not been completed and that certain alterations were desired. This provided the prerequisite for additional trips to East Berlin.

The mechanic traveled to the DIA for Chemistry every 4-6 weeks and received 200 DM-West for travel expenses each time. During one of these visits, Ritter asked him if he could name West German technicians and designers who would be interested in finding applications for their inventions in the GDR. The mechanic promised to let him know. After consulting with designers M, P, and H, who were known to him, were working at the Henschel Works, and were to supplementing their incomes by doing designing work in their spare time, the mechanic gave his case officer in East Berlin their names. In summer 1955, M was accompanied by the mechanic to East Berlin in order to meet Ritter. During a second visit, M. gave Ritter design drawings of a pilot boring mill for crankshaft housings. Sometime later, the mechanic also took designer P



with him to East Berlin. He himself had, in the meantime, met Mischura, a member of the Polish Commercial Commission in East Berlin who was also interested in inventions. Without Ritter becoming aware of it, the mechanic offered the Pole several drawings, including those of the Henschel designers. During 5-6 trips to East Berlin, the mechanic acted as courier for the Henschel designers. Among others, he transmitted original drawings of the Henschel Works which had been spirited out of the enterprise.

During a meeting at the beginning of 1956 in East Berlin, Ritter brought out a receipt which bore the imprint of the SSD. Up to that time, only innocuous receipts had been used. The mechanic refused to sign, but, nevertheless, continued to work for Ritter, whose real affiliation he now knew. At approximately the same time, designers M, P, and H recruited designer K, who was also working at the Henschel Works. Although the plan, with the assistance of Ritter, to establish a separate designing office in Kassel, failed, K participated in the deliveries of documentation to East Berlin. He made available original documentation of the enterprise for which he had worked previously. In August 1956 -- the mechanic had come to East Berlin to deliver some material -- there was a misunderstanding with Ritter. The problem was the relationship toward the Polish trade mission. The mechanic was placed under house arrest for several days in Mahlow until such times as he was prepared to sign a document, according to which he would henceforth work only for the Ministry of State Security. In return, he was promised a set monthly salary. In addition to this, he received license payments for the use of his water faucet.

In September 1956, K accompanied him to East Berlin. He met Ritter and was recruited for intelligence collaboration. K worked for several large firms on orders of the Federal Ministry of National Defense involving the development of a protective armor for infantrymen. He delivered documentation on the infantry armor to the mechanic, having personally duplicated this information in one large enterprise. In addition, he told the mechanic that he had other material which he wanted to sell for more money, but that he could make it available only for a very short period of time. The mechanic reported this to East Berlin and was equipped with a special camera with which he was supposed to photograph the documents. He met K in a Hannover hotel. He photographed the drawings and brought the exposed film to East Berlin. The undertaking misfired, and the pictures had to be taken over again. A short time thereafter, K told the mechanic that he had accepted a position with a Bremen automobile firm. Future meetings were then held in Bremen. K gave the mechanic drawings of an armored personnel carrier and provided him with photographs. Shortly after the meeting in Bremen, the entire group was arrested by the police.



3. State Security Service at Leipzig Trade Fair

During the Leipzig Trade Fair in the spring and fall of each year, the SSD maintains a special contingent in Leipzig under the leadership of the chief of the HVA. In addition, collaborators of the HVA and the other departments of the SSD are posted at all reporting offices and trade fair offices. For example, in the trade fair office in the city of Leipzig, they form a regular legal residency. Control of this residency lies in the hands of the Department for Economic-Scientific Research. The collaborators in the trade fair office check on the documents of foreign and West German guests and pass on orders to the various specialized departments of the HVA. Even the registration offices for West German and foreign visitors include collaborators of the SSD who twice daily compile lists of names of all guests to the fair who originate in West Germany and send the list to the special SSD component.

During the all-German workers conferences, which take place in connection with the Leipzig Trade Fair, the HVA employs hundreds of collaborators who approach West German trade unionists and attempt to establish intelligence contacts. For this purpose, the SSD in Leipzig also maintains a net of illegal dead letter drops. They are serviced by special couriers. The HVA pays special attention to prostitutes active in Leipzig. Several dozen prostitutes of both sexes are used during the trade fair by secret collaborators and are under orders to establish intelligence contacts "while plying their trade" or to set up compromising situations which can be used to establish such contacts.

4. Advertisements and Their Consequences

a. On 6 May 1957, a West German daily newspaper contained the following advertisement: "25-year-old waiter, personable, currently employed, wishes change. Would like to have position in large hotel or as diplomatic driver, commensurate with experience and knowledge. Has all necessary driver permits." Sometime after this advertisement appeared, the waiter received an offer from East Berlin. A labor office, calling itself "Ruschkamp" and located at Berlin-Oberschoneweide, Helmholtzstrasse No 44, offered him a position at a beach hotel in the GDR. He was asked to come to Berlin at their expense. The waiter did as requested, was received by the chief of the labor office in Oberschoneweide who immediately placed him in touch with a collaborator of the SSD. The latter no longer spoke of a position in a beach hotel, but had a definite assignment for the 25-year-old. "Go back to the Federal Republic; work for us in West Germany; you will not regret it. Report on all military preparations which threaten peace...we are interested in everything."



b. A 32-year-old journalist found an advertisement in a large Hamburg paper in the fall of 1957, originating in East Berlin. A press office, bearing the name "INTERPRESS," was looking for collaborators. He applied. As a sample of his style, he was requested to submit a detailed report about the city state of Bremen, and the instructions accompanying this assignment also stated: "We are interested primarily in the political conditions." The 32-year-old wrote the report and personally took it to East Berlin. The chief of the office for interior politics at INTERPRESS received him in a very friendly way and gave him a new assignment. This time he was to provide the service regulations for the Federal Navy -- for the INTERPRESS Bureau of the SSD.

#### 5. Student

At the beginning of 1956, a law student, Werner M., was summoned before the People's Police. He had to appear at a precinct station in Lichtenburg and was introduced to a unidentified man who was apparently exceptionally well informed regarding M's political difficulties at the Humboldt University law faculty. The stranger pointed out to M that it was high time he took on a verification assignment [to prove his loyalty]. The assignment was to include inquiries about the fate of so-called "republic defectors" in the Federal Republic of Germany and the conditions at West German universities. M was asked to register with a university in Nordrhein-Westphalia or in lower Saxony. M requested some time to think it over; a subsequent discussion took place during which M expressed his readiness to execute the assignment. He signed an obligation declaration and was sent to the federal republic for the first time at Whitsuntide of 1956. He was supposed to look around in Bonn. During his visit, he made the acquaintance of an administrative worker and remained in contact with her from that point on.

Before M moved to the federal republic, his employers instructed him in the art of transmitting reports and decoding short-wave radio transmissions. He was instructed to monitor short-wave radio transmissions on the 31-meter band every Thursday at 1900 hours and, after a certain day, also every Sunday at 1100 hours to listen for his orders. During the remaining days prior to his final departure, the SSD ordered him to behave like a grumbler. He was expelled from the university because of antiparty sentiments. In mid-June 1956, he went to Kassel, registered there, and requested the issuance of a personal identification document of the federal republic. From Kassel, he wrote letters to the cover address of Marianne Fiedler, Berlin-Mahlsdorf. Upon orders of the SSD, which had transmitted money to him through a courier, M joined his father in Austria in September 1956 for a period of several months.



At Christmas time in 1956, he was again in East Berlin and received a large sum of money from his case officer "Horst"; he was also instructed in the use of special writing paper (micro dot system). He attempted to establish contact in Bonn and its environs with collaborators of foreign embassies and ministries. He was once again sent to Austria for a few months and then returned to East Berlin in the spring. He had to leave his fiance upon orders from the SSD and was finally dispatched to Bonn in July of 1957. He took a position with a bank and was ordered to attend many "rendezvous" in Cologne by radio. During one such meeting, which took place on Neusser Platz, he was ordered by a collaborator of the SSD to take over the case of a girl who was also in contact with East Berlin. In February 1958, he received radio orders to meet Barbara G. at the Graf-Adolf-Platz in Dusseldorf. As a recognition signal, G was supposed to wear a large ring with an animal head decoration, and M was to use a cigarette-lighter with five indentations in the monogram shield. The rendezvous took place at the predetermined time, and when the two parted, a new rendezvous was arranged, and G was given 200 DM.

G was signed up by the SSD in East Berlin in 1957 and received the cover name of Ursel and the cover address: Else Schmidt, Berlin-Niederschoneeweide, Flutstrasse No 1. She was told to get her matriculation (Abitur) in the federal republic first and then to study law in order to prepare for a career in the diplomatic service. Her final destination was to be the diplomatic service of the federal republic. The SSD was counting on a preparatory period of 5-6 years. During this time, G was to take on only small assignments and to assist case officer M. During a subsequent meeting, she was to receive 600 DM-East and "orders" to move to Frankfurt and study there. However, she went to Heidelberg and sought connections with American families. She was even successful in obtaining a situation as a domestic helper in the home of a collaborator of the American headquarters whose family she had met several times. During November and December 1958, G met with M in front of the main post office in Heidelberg. M continued to maintain the contact with the East Berlin headquarters.

In addition, M maintained contact with 26-year-old secretary Ingeborg R. She was of Argentine origin and had returned to Germany after the war to Chemnitz. While there, she had been requested by two SSD collaborators to move to the federal republic. It was further suggested to her that she take an interpreter's examination in Spanish and Portuguese. She went to Bonn and worked there as a secretary in the Paraguayan Embassy. She was also instructed in the receipt of enciphered



radio reports, and this means was used to bring her together with M, whom she knew as Werner Richter. The final goal of her activity was a job in the Foreign Office in Bonn. The contents of the reports submitted by group M dealt primarily with universities, foreign representative offices, federal ministries, and the US European headquarters in Heidelberg.

#### 6. SED "Journalist"

A collaborator of the ADN state news agency committed a gross political error in his work in the fall of 1955. He was dismissed and was to seek a position in a production enterprise. One attempt to be recognized as a refugee in West Berlin failed, and the ADN employee returned to the Eastern sector. He was re-employed by his former office, the foreign desk of ADN, as an assistant editor, but was simultaneously made available to the SSD through his personnel chief. The SSD ordered him to make intelligence inquiries in the federal republic under cover of journalistic work. Thus, in January 1956, he was dispatched to Koblenz, with the following orders: "Obtain a city plan, a city directory, and accurate sketches of the railroad network, rivers, and West German army installations; describe the city, streets, and houses; photograph principal traffic junctions and port facilities and provide information on the extent to which they are navigable; and provide information on the degree of destruction of the city and the degree of reconstruction, on the power supply for the city (capacity, long-distance power lines, transformer stations, and gas supply), on industrial enterprises, primarily chemistry, on water supply (river, well, and ground water), and on sewage in the city (methods of construction). Furthermore, provide information about city traffic, the number of vehicles (old or new), work shops, the communications network (telephone and radio), the telephone directory, military installations and their organization, allied offices, number of employees, etc. Also, provide a description of industries and information on annual production, armaments problems, forests in the vicinity, width and depth of rivers, currents, climatic conditions, bridges, and capacities (stone, wood, and steel).

In return for this assignment, the ADN journalist received a sum of 550 DM-West.

#### 7. Letter to a Police Official

An incident which took place in the spring of 1959 in Nordrhein-Westphalia characterizes the recruiting methods of the SSD. A police sergeant received a total of four letters from a certain Erich Schneider from Berlin Niederschoneweide, Schnellerstrasse No 71 A. In all four



letters, Schneider claimed that he had information about the alleged former activity of the police sergeant with the Gestapo in Bohemia. He requested that the sergeant come to East Berlin in order to discuss the future fate of the documents. Main Department I of the Ministry of State Security is located on Schnellerstrasse in Berlin-Niederschoneweide. The intent was obviously to place the police sergeant under pressure, and it is entirely possible that in such cases the Ministry of State Security may make the alleged original documents available to certain West German organizations for utilization in a defamation campaign.

Upon being informed of the above, the Ministry of State Security, in a long conversation, this man who called himself Funk, demanded I's cooperation in the "political commission" of the Ministry of State Security. Funk gave me the impression that he was a high-ranking official. The meeting took place, and the details of future meetings were discussed. Funk introduced me to a number of the Ministry of State Security officials who were to take care of him. This man was called Hermann, and he pointed out the very first conversation that there was a possibility of offering employment with the SED at a monthly salary of 120 DM. At the moment, however, I was to write reports about his fellow students and to submit a handwritten report on his own life history. I actually signed an affidavit and delivered the material to the SED regarding the survey of names and addresses of my students. In August 1957, Hermann sent me to East Berlin and advised me to take his wife with him and was requested only to report on the matter controls and to make inquiries as to whether his English speaking abilities would be recognized in the West. He did as ordered and upon his return met with Hermann in the "Haus der Kulturen der Welt" (House of the Cultures of the World) in the Federal Republic of Germany. It was proposed to him that he move to the Federal Republic of Germany. I made his agreement conditional upon a conversation with his wife, but, nevertheless, signed the following statement: "I hereby agree to cooperate with the Ministry of State Security. I know that in case of a violation of my security agreement, I can be punished according to the laws of the GDR." His wife also signed a similar statement after speaking with Hermann.

In December 1957, I went to East Berlin with his wife and received a 2 1/2-room apartment in Hagenpark, at which the rent was paid by the Ministry of State Security. At a salary of 600 DM-Funk plus 300 DM expense money, he underwent training. He received documents on the activities of the SED and the counterintelligence components of the Federal Republic. Each week, Hermann subjected him to an examination. Thus, for example, he had to establish so-called dead letter drops at a cemetery under a grave marker, in a construction house, and in a tree, in the Eastern sector. Hermann checked on the progress of the work and evaluated it. The last letter of a dead letter drop in a house of the American sector of Berlin at the beginning of March 1958 was considered a sort of final examination. I was then told to observe the Berlin Office of the Federal Republic Ministry and to ensure that the examination was also part of his "final examination". Upon passing the examination, I was told that he was to be assigned as case officer in West Germany and to handle two so-called sources.



8. Student With an Agent Examination

Gunter L., 28 years old, was a candidate for an examination at the Advanced School of Transportation in Dresden in 1957. He was a member of the FDJ (Free German Youth Movement), the German-Soviet Friendship Society, the GST (Association for Sports and Technology), and the SED. He had originally been a locksmith, and, as a worker-farmer student, had come to the advanced school. In February 1957, he was ordered to appear before the prorector who introduced him to a collaborator of the GDR Ministry of the Interior. In a long conversation, this man who called himself Funk, demanded L's cooperation in the "political consolidation" of the student body. Funk gave L one month to think it over. In March, another meeting took place, and the details of future meetings were discussed. Funk introduced L to a member of the Ministry of State Security who was to take care of him. This man was called Herman, and he pointed out in the very first conversation that there was a possibility of offering L employment with the SSD at a monthly salary of 750 DM. At the moment, however, L was to write reports about his fellow students and to submit a handwritten report on his own life history. L actually spied on some students and delivered the material to the SSD regarding the surveillance and arrest of two students. In August 1957, Herman sent L to Kiel. He was permitted to take his wife with him and was required only to report on the border controls and to make inquiries as to whether his engineering diploma would be recognized in the West. He did as ordered and upon his return met with Herman in the "Neue Ratskeller" (restaurant) in Dresden. It was proposed to him that he move to the Federal Republic of Germany. L made his agreement conditional upon a conversation with his wife, but, nevertheless, signed the following statement: "I hereby obligate myself to collaborate with the Ministry of State Security; I promise to remain loyal to the worker-peasant state. I know that in case of violation of my secrecy agreement, I can be punished according to the laws of the GDR." His wife also signed a similar statement after speaking with Herman.

In December 1957, L went to East Berlin with his wife and received a 2 1/2-room apartment in Rangsdorf on which the rent was paid by the Ministry of State Security. At a salary of 600 DM-East plus 200 DM expense money, he underwent training. He received documents on the activities of the SSD and the counterintelligence components of the federal republic. Each week, Herman subjected him to an examination. Thus, for example, he had to establish so-called dead letter drops at a cemetery under a grave marker, in a construction fence, and in a tree, in the Eastern sector. Herman checked on the progress of the work and evaluated it. The installation of a dead letter drop in a board fence of the American sector of Berlin at the beginning of March 1958 was considered a sort of final examination. L was then told to observe the Berlin Office of the Federal Transport Ministry and to execute sketches; this was also part of his "final examination." Upon passing the examination, L was told that he was to be assigned as case officer in West Germany and to handle four so-called sources.



Between 5 and 11 March, L was active at the Leipzig Trade Fair and made efforts to establish contact with West German fair visitors and visitors to the All-German Workers Conference. He was supposed to recruit those persons he approached as secret collaborators for the SSD. In addition to this, he was supposed to check on two dead letter drops in the city of Leipzig. He was able to get close to a chairman of an enterprise council from Mainz and a businessman from the vicinity of Frankfurt/Main. They were given cover names and were appointed as liaison links. At the end of March, L traveled to Garmisch equipped with enterprise passes of the foreign trade enterprise of the Soviet Zone. He looked up an "animal lover," a pensioned government official, and, as a sign of beginning collaboration with the SSD, brought him a book on animals which he had received from Herman. Subsequently, L went to Bonn and Heidelberg. In Bonn, he was supposed to look up a cousin, and in Heidelberg a girl student whose fiance had moved to the GDR without saying good-bye. L was to give the student the following verbal message: Come to East Berlin. Your fiance has changed his mind and is waiting for you there." The girl was scheduled to be a secret collaborator for the University of Heidelberg. However, she did not come. In the fall of 1958, L went to Cologne to meet collaborator F and to prepare the way for making contact with leading officials of the Federal Railroads. As both of the men, sitting in a Cologne restaurant, were writing their experiences on so-called contact paper, they were surprised and arrested.

9. Kassel Headquarters (A case from the files of the Main Administration for Intelligence)

In 1950, a baker, one Otto Meier, joined the Communist Party in a large city in Hesse. He became the cashier of a city presidium and later an assistant with the Kreis Presidium in Kassel-Bettenhausen. Since 1955, he had been an escort for so-called West German worker delegations going to the GDR to view enterprises there. On the occasions of such visits to the GDR, personal, political, and trade union contacts between workers of large enterprises in Kassel and in Weimer, Erfurt, and Gotha were to be established. Meier came in close contact with FDGB (Free German Trade Union Movement) officials, particularly with those charged with working with the West.

In the spring of 1956, FDGB instructors, under the control of the East Berlin Office for Trade Union Affairs (a legal residence of the HVA), established contact with Meier. The first contact was made by a certain Heinz; then, for a longer period, there was Albert, who also appeared as a colleague from the FDGB and occasionally as a West German colleague. From the spring of 1957 until the arrest of the members of the Kassel ring the function of case officer was carried on by a certain Passarge who went under the pseudonym of Erich and by one Sack who called himself Kurt. These persons maintained contact with the East Berlin Bureau for Trade Union Affairs; provided materials; and supervised disbursements and assignments, the latter mostly involving on information on conditions within enterprises



and the provision of production documentation. Meier, who was very active from spring 1956 until the end of October 1957 in behalf of the various instructors, recruited participants for trips into the GDR from among the workers at Kassel. When they returned, he invited them, upon orders from Erich and Kurt, to discussion evenings. On such occasions, the conversation mostly revolved around the creation of closer contacts between individual participants the creation of groups, and participation in the All-German Worker Conferences in Leipzig. Meier himself participated in three such conferences. In addition, and upon orders of the FDGB Presidium for West Germany, he attended a so-called All-German discussion with trade union officials in East Berlin. He also recruited persons for a trade union course sponsored by the FDGB in the Soviet Zone. Finally, he was successful in creating a working group which met every 2 weeks and discussed trade union problems.

In this manner, the instructors from East Berlin were given the opportunity of speaking with West German members of the DGB (German Trade Union Movement -- West) and, through interrogation of the participants, to gain knowledge about internal conditions in enterprises, wages, and production problems, as well as details of trade union work. Instructor Albert requested a detailed report of events following a Bezirk delegate conference of the DGB which took place at the beginning of 1957 in Heppenheim. At one of the next conferences, the working circle of the Kassel headquarters was represented by delegates who attempted to create a positive atmosphere for the official establishment of contacts with the FDGB. The majority rejected the requests of the delegates from the HVA. Nevertheless, Erich and Kurt did not give up their plans. Their main target was the Industrial Trade Union of Metal Workers (Industriegewerkschaft Metall); both of them wanted to use the pretext of this trade union to gain entrance to the Henschel Works in order to create a group within the works. While this pair made every effort to solve this problem, Meier was busy issuing an information bulletin for dissemination among metal workers in Hesse. The mailing list was provided him by a member of the wage office of the Henschel Works. Through this bulletin, Meier and the FDGB instructors attempted to establish contact with DGB officials. They had no success. Nevertheless, they were able to establish a youth group of the work circle in a furniture factory. As Meier and the instructors attempted to recruit contact persons working for the Federal Railroads in Kassel, the entire work circle was exposed, and the FDGB headquarters in Kassel (controlled by the HVA) was forced to halt its activity.

#### 10. Two New Methods

a. In the fall of 1959, the Ministry of State Security Bezirk Administration for Berlin had a special plan. It was known as the "Translation Bureau."



An employee of the West Berlin Senate wanted to obtain a pass, through normal channels, to enable him to visit relatives in the Soviet Zone. He visited a pass office in the Soviet sector of Berlin and met 60-year-old Albert R. R was allegedly also submitting a pass application. However, since July 1957, he had been in close contact with the Ministry of State Security. At that time, he had requested a pass to visit relatives in Bernburg on the Saale and had been addressed by an SSD collaborator on that occasion for whom he began, at the latter's request, to procure West Berlin stamps on a current basis. Not until the end of 1958 was the 60-year-old person placed under written contract with the SSD. As he established connections with the West Berlin Senate employee, he reported to the Berlin Bezirk Administration of the Ministry of State Security and was made aware of the "Translations Office". Upon SSD orders, he visited the West Berlin employee in his apartment. He offered him 10,000 DM-West to open a translation bureau in West Berlin. According to the plan, the Senate employee was supposed to equip an office and procure government orders [for translations] on the basis of his contacts. All documents which were to come into his possession in this manner -- those were the conditions imposed by the SSD -- were to be photographed and the photographs channeled to the SSD through Albert R. The Senate employee appeared to agree to the plan, but immediately informed West Berlin authorities who were successful in arresting Albert R.

b. In February 1960, employees of the West Berlin Senate were receiving almost daily telephone calls in their offices and were addressed by unknown persons in the following manner: "I have been told that an unidentified man who was injured during an accident in East Berlin gave your name. The man has thus far not been identified since he is unconscious and has no identity documents. Can you tell me which of your East Berlin acquaintances this could be?" If the West Berlin Senate employee then gave the names of several East Berlin friends or relatives, he was asked to visit an East Berlin hospital. The names were "obtained" by the SSD in this manner were used to place a number of East Berlin residents under pressure to force them to collaborate.

#### 11. "Refugees"

a. One of the most favored tactics of the SSD is to dispatch persons who have already worked for the SSD and who are scheduled to be sent to the federal republic with orders to "let yourself be recognized as a political refugee in the Federal Emergency Reception Center at Marienfelde." For this purpose, the forgery headquarters of the SSD produces documentation from which it is evident that the "refugee" left the Soviet Zone fearing for life and limb. Thus, sometime ago, 32-year-old Gerhard L. arrived in Berlin-Marienfelde. He had worked for the SSD in Prenzlau and was now scheduled to transfer his area of activity to the Cologne area.



b. A 26-year-old sheet-metal worker came from Leipzig and was arrested in the refugee camp because he had worked for the SSD in the Soviet Zone and because he had already been active as an agent in the federal republic; he had "fled" for the first time in 1957 and, upon SSD orders, had worked in southern Germany. After returning to the Soviet Zone, he continued his activity there.

c. Willie H., a 27-year-old, fled the Soviet Zone in May 1958 and settled in Luebeck. In November 1958, he wanted to return to his homeland, but was arrested at the border by the SSD and, following 3 months of training, was sent back to Luebeck with orders to maintain surveillance over nine citizens there. He executed the orders to the satisfaction of the SSD, attended an SED party school, and again "fled" to West Berlin where he was arrested.

d. Dieter H., a 21-year-old, moved from West Berlin to the Soviet Zone at the end of 1956. Following a 2 year tour of duty in the East German Army, he was discharged as a corporal and employed as a shunter on the Reichsbahn. Upon orders from the SSD, he began spying on his fellow workers in Thuringia and, later, in Halle. Then he received orders to "flee" to West Berlin and have himself sent to Munich. He was arrested in the refugee camp.

## 12. Peculiar Strike Leader -- Example of the Work of the HVA

In 1958, a strike, lasting from 10 July to 30 December, took place in a hosiery factory in Bischofswiesen near Berchtesgaden. The strike leader at the factory was Harry S. He was a member of the strike presidium and editor of the strike bulletins. One day, Harry S. was offered assistance by the GDR Trade Union. The East Berlin press placed itself at his disposal. He met ADN correspondents and collaborators of the Deutschlandsender Radio in Munich. On this occasion, he made the acquaintance of an FDGB official who invited him to East Berlin on 6 October. He was very cordially received in the office of the Industrial Trade Union of Textile, Garment, and Leather Workers in East Berlin, was taken to the guest house of the FDGB in Berlin C 2, Invalidenstrasse 20-22, was assigned the cover name of "Sebastian," was permitted to eat and drink whatever he wanted, was introduced to Walter Ulbricht at the opera house, and had a number of other "pleasant experiences" in East Berlin.

He organized a package campaign for the striking workers at the hosiery plant, including his own family; he dictated scripts for the Communist "Freedom Radio 904" and received assignments to report on matters in the federal republic. In addition, Harry S. was to establish contact groups for the FDGB in the West. Shortly before his departure from East Berlin, a small celebration was organized in his honor in the rooms of the



State Radio Committee at Schoneweide, Naleppastrasse. On that occasion, a certain "Renate" appeared. Renate consoled the lonely husband and strike leader. Later, the completely inebriated Harry S. was not able to remember Renate's apartment quite so well, but the SSD had documentary evidence regarding the events which took place there. Harry S was confronted with this evidence and was asked whether he wanted his wife to find out. Naturally, he did not wish this and signed an obligation contract for collaboration with the Ministry of State Security or, to put it more specifically, with the HVA.

### 13. Stable Hand

Stable hand Karl-Heinz L., born on 7 December 1922, became a Soviet prisoner of war in 1944. He was educated in an antifacist camp in the Soviet Union and, after his discharge, became a member of the SED. In January 1949, he found employment with the German Sports Committee (Deutscher Sportausschuss) as an FDGB escort for GDR sport teams traveling to West Germany. In 1955, he changed employment, transferring to the GST, and was dismissed in December 1959 for drunkenness. He remained unemployed until February 1956. Toward the end of February, he was visited in his apartment in Neuenhagen by two civilians who referred to themselves Walter and Heinz. They invited him to travel with them to East Berlin. During the journey, they revealed themselves as being members of the Ministry of State Security. They took L to the safe house "Wicht" in Berlin-Friedrichshain, Stalinallee 284. There, they offered him a salary of 750 DM-East plus expenses. He signed a secrecy agreement and the customary collaboration contract. He was assigned the cover name of Harry. In March 1956, he was dispatched to the Leipzig Trade Fair, and there he met Eugene. In 8-10 days, he attempted to establish contacts with visitors to the trade fair who came from the federal republic. He had no success. His second assignment was phrased as follows: "Go to the West Berlin amusement establishment 'Resi' and seek to make the acquaintances of females; determine the addresses of these women and attempt to use this means to approach West Berlin equestrian circles." In the summer of 1956, L traveled to the federal republic on three occasions; for this purpose he received money from "Walter" and a West Berlin personal identity document made out to a "Klaus Baer." He was to pose as a Western reporter and visit the American Embassy in Mehlem to obtain documents from there. Finally, he traveled, together with a certain "Erich," in the guise of a sports editor of the Berlin Telegraph, to Westerland on Sylt Island. He was equipped with an "Exacta-Varex" camera with telephoto lens. At the destination, Erich was suppose to establish a relationship with the secretary of the former Federal Defense Minister, who was spending her vacation in Westerland. During an incidental walk, Erich was supposed to embrace the secretary whereupon Harry was to photograph them with the telephoto lens to obtain compromising material to be used at a subsequent date for intelligence purposes.



#### 14. Aerial Espionage

A 36-year-old carpenter, his 33-year-old wife, and a 43-year-old photographer were arrested sometime ago because they had been conducting aerial espionage in Schleswig-Holstein upon orders of the SSD. The carpenter was an enthusiastic sports aviator. According to his own testimony, he had long sought to join the West German Bundeswehr. He began as a glider pilot and, in order to obtain material on gliding from the GDR, establish contact with the GST. He received inexpensive spare parts from the GDR and was brought together with officials. On the occasion of one such meeting he made the acquaintance of a certain Soltau who did not introduce himself in any more detail but who immediately guided the conversation toward topics of military installations in Schleswig-Holstein, as well as traffic in the Nordostsee Canal and aerial photographs of large cities. He advised the 36 year old carpenter to rent a motor-driven aircraft. Later, Soltau introduced himself by his full name and his official rank. He was Major Ernst Weier of the SSD. The carpenter received money from him and was equipped with cameras and developing equipment.

Activity in behalf of the SSD was one of the many occupations to which the carpenter devoted himself with enthusiasm. He had previously attempted to open a detective agency; he had operated a small workshop and had traveled as a salesman. Because of his flightiness, his friends did not take him seriously. They all wondered, however, where the money for his "hobby" came from, particularly when he purchased a very modern sports aircraft for 12,000 DM from England, with which he regularly crossed the Nordostsee Canal and the Schleswig-Holstein coastal area. One day he lost control of the aircraft and landed in the water. He was rescued, and the aircraft was salvaged. However, in the process, the special cameras, as well as several other interesting "technical items," were discovered. The wife of the aerial spy testified before the court that she had acted as a courier for her husband. She made the acquaintance of Soltau during a visit in the GDR in the middle of 1957 and traveled to East Berlin a total of eight different times. On such occasions, she carried with her a specially designed umbrella which contained microfilms or she carried photographs with her concealed in hollowed-out sandwiches.

The photographer was not a witting participant of the aerial espionage; he had only made authorized aerial photographs which his friend, the carpenter, also forwarded to East Berlin.



## VII. CRIMINALS AS COLLABORATORS OF THE STATE SECURITY SERVICE

The Ministry of State Security frequently uses criminals to carry out crimes of intelligence significance or attacks on the freedom of West Berliners or other citizens in the federal republic. Habitual criminals, callous psychopaths, and unscrupulous persons are utilized, regardless of the violations of which they may be guilty, when the Ministry of State Security is convinced that it has found a usable tool without willpower. Federal authorities and courts have recorded about 80 cases in which persons who had been sentenced to severe prison sentences for criminal acts were used as agents or kidnappers. Specially trained officers of the SSD are constantly active at locations which are considered underworld meeting points in various large cities of the GDR, as well as in the federal republic, and search for persons who might be useful for certain missions. At the beginning of 1960, Federal Security authorities raided a beer hall in the West Berlin district of Neukoelln which served as a meeting place for homosexuals, prostitutes, and habitual criminals. Agents of the SSD had regularly visited the establishment in efforts to palm off these "rascals" on the foreigners who occasionally visited the same establishment. In the establishment and the adjoining rooms, indescribable scenes took place, night after night, with the sole purpose of compromising those persons who participated in them and who were allegedly filmed by the SSD. A search of the rooms revealed a substantial quantity of loot from various robberies or illegal business transactions; it was confiscated.

A crass example of the method of utilizing criminal elements in intelligence work or violent crimes executed in the interest of the intelligence service is the case of Silvester Murau.

In the fall of 1953, Murau, a major in the SSD serving in the appropriate department of the Bezirk Administration of Schwerin, left the GDR and fled to the federal republic. He wanted to start a new life and, since he had not learned any trade, wanted to work as a simple laborer. The SSD, however, does not like to lose witting collaborators who have gained an insight into its methods and missions, particularly not, as was the case with Silvester Murau, old Communists who knew a lot about activities within the SED. An agent of the ministry in Berlin was given the assignment of finding persons in West Berlin who were supposed to effect the "redefection" of Murau. The agent visited the southeastern part of Berlin and went to several underworld meeting places. There, he met many old "customers," people who have been "helping" the SSD for years. Thus, for example, he met professional criminal Heinz Horeis, who had a long police record and who was 24 years old at that time. The agent addressed him, asked if he knew how to drive a car, and held out the prospects of a sizeable transaction in case Horeis could come up with an accomplice. Horeis found the "amateur criminal," one Joachim Tietze. They both received orders to travel to the Federal Republic of Germany in a rented



automobile, the rent for which was paid by the SSD. They were to approach Silvester Murau, who lived in Odenwald, to gain his confidence so as later to be able to kidnap him across the border at a suitable moment. The SSD promised them 5,000 DM-West if they were successful.

The agent who was entrusted with the indoctrination of both these criminals first tested them by giving them orders to break into a West Berlin printing plant whose activities disturbed the SSD and to start a fire there. Both of the criminals reported the execution of this order, but actually they had only carried the gasoline canisters and rope ladders as far as the front of the building and had left them there, their motto being: "always play it safe." Both criminals took the assignment to kidnap Murau very seriously. They were particularly impressed because this mission was connected with being able to drive a brand new Opel-Kapitaen automobile. First, they drove about in Odenwald making plans for the "deportation" of Murau; finally, they did seek his acquaintance in a restaurant at Heubach. In the mean-time Murau's daughter joined the pair and was supposed to help them in their efforts. The SSD had sent her from Schwerin with orders to play the "good child." With the assistance of the daughter, Horeis and Tietze were able to overcome Murau's distrust rapidly. They escorted him on a number of visits to various taverns and returned with him late in the evening when he was drunk.

Three days later, the two men, the daughter, and Murau went on a "drinking tour" throughout the area; they drove to the zonal border via Aschaffenburg, Schweinfurt, and Bamberg. They stopped at all locations and drank until Murau became unconscious. Only Tietze who had to drive did not drink. As an extra precaution, Murau's daughter held a handkerchief which was soaked in a narcotic agent against her father's nose. At a predetermined place, the kidnappers crossed the zonal border and handed Murau over to a collaborator of the Ministry of State Security who had come especially for that purpose from East Berlin. Both of the criminals then returned to Berlin. Murau was allegedly interrogated in Schwerin and publicly -- that is to say before collaborators of the Bezirk Administration of the SSD -- hanged. Horeis and Tietze were later arrested in West Berlin and sentenced to 12 and 10 years in prison, respectively.

#### VIII. EXTRACTS FROM CASES RELATED BY FORMER MEMBERS OF THE MINISTRY OF STATE SECURITY

##### A. Lieutenant Helmut Fleischer

Lieutenant Helmut Fleischer, 24 years of age, has been an official collaborator of the Ministry of State Security since he was 18. He is a member of what is commonly referred to by the SED leadership as the "sharp sword of the party." His career led him directly from the Bezirk office in Erfurt to the HVA, that is, into political espionage, where he worked in Department 2.



In a conversation, the former SSD lieutenant first related the main assignments of his department and then turned to details, including several items pertaining to methods:

"My main assignment was the SDU (Christian Democratic Union) and the CSU (Christian Socialist Union) parties in the federal republic. In this assignment, I made use of the agents in the East Berlin CDU party presidium who had been recruited for intelligence work, particularly the West Department of this party presidium. The HVA, primarily its political sectors, have agents, that is, recruited and obligated collaborators of the Ministry of State Security, in all so-called bourgeois parties of the GDR. Such agents are in the CDU, the LDP, and the NDP, as well as in the mass organizations such as the DFB (German Federation of Women), the Cultural Association (Kulturbund), and the Trade Union Movement. These agents are ordered to recruit party members or members of these organizations who have relationships with West Germany, based either on family ties or acquaintances, for journeys into the federal republic. Thus, the all-German phase of the work of these parties and organizations is widely utilized for political espionage in the federal republic. For example: a Kreis chairman of the CDU in the GDR has a relative in the federal republic who happens to be an official of the Western branch of the CDU. The recruited agent in the West Department of the Eastern [GDR] branch of the CDU summons this Kreis chairman and orders him to carry out a propaganda journey to visit his relatives in the federal republic. Naturally, this contact results in a political conversation, during which the West German individual is exploited on an information basis. That is to say, he unwittingly reveals political information to his visitor from the GDR which is of interest to East Berlin.

When the traveler returns to the GDR, he must report to the Eastern branch of the CDU. A written report is required in addition to an oral presentation. The written report automatically lands on the desk of the appropriate collaborator in the HVA. If the report is of interest, that is, if it is worthy of further processing, then, to stay with my example, the Kreis chairman of the Eastern CDU is recruited by the SSD and given the mission of processing his relative in the federal republic. Thus, we can see that this Kreis chairman is forced to work on his relative with the object of eventual agent recruitment in mind. In this manner, the simple traveler gradually slides into the clutches of the intelligence service, having only actually undertaken a propaganda journey upon orders of the West Department of the CDU. Very frequently, the relationships which form during such journeys are utilized by inviting the Western person to a celebration in the GDR. At that time, he is processed directly by organs of the SSD.



"I must say that the person who is initially sent to the federal republic to make the contact is interrogated in detail upon his return regarding the personal weaknesses and inclinations of the relative. The material obtained in this manner finds application during a subsequent visit to the GDR or during subsequent conversations in the federal republic. I can tell you that prominent politicians are sought in the federal republic who, in certain political questions and matters of detail, entertain a different opinion than that held by the political leadership of the federal republic or the leadership of their own parties. These persons have frequently been invited to gatherings in the GDR to meet prominent representatives of the GDR government and of the party leaderships of the CDU. On such occasions, conversations took place which were designed to urge these West German persons to publicly express their opinions of federal governments' policies.

"For purposes of such conversations with prominent personages from the federal republic, Gerald Gotting, Secretary General of the CDU-East, was frequently used, as was party chairman August Bach. A typical example of such proceedings was the Prof Walter Hagemann case; it is certain that the professor never knew who was actually behind these conversations and events. [Note: Hagemann was professor of journalism at the University of Munster. He frequently appeared at public events, including those in East Berlin, and expressed opposition to the policy of the federal republic and of his own party, the CDU. He also used events sponsored by the SED as platforms. Because of these events, he was expelled from the CDU.]

"All of the activity of the HVA serves to support political measures introduced by the SED. Persons who, in matters of small detail, indicate opposition to the policies of Adenauer are represented as supporters of another Germany. The HVA carries on a number of additional political activities in support of SED policies. I would like to cite an example from West Berlin. At a time when the question of assigning the status of a 'free city' to West Berlin became critical, the HVA went into action immediately. Through its tremendous staff of agents, opinions were disseminated among the West Berlin population which were designed to create unrest in the city. For example, an argument was posed to the effect that the large West German enterprises are withdrawing their orders from West Berlin and that there is also a flight of capital of these large firms from West Berlin. The propaganda went so far as to include rumors that foreign diplomatic missions in West Berlin are preparing for evacuation.

"The HVA operates a large staff of agents but is not alone in this activity. The Ministry of State Security and the many secret services of the East Bloc nations which operate out of East Berlin also maintain wide spread agent nets. The largest of these is the one operated by the Ministry of State Security. In the area of political intelligence alone, there are some 750 clandestine collaborators. This number is augmented by



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many secret informants and clandestine principal agents. It is alleged that every clandestine collaborator controls at least 30 secret informants and principal agents.

"In 1959, when Captain Heim of Department 2 of the HVA defected to West Germany, a number of agents who had been active in the CDU/CSU were arrested there. Eastern authorities attempted to pass information to the population of the GDR, as well as that of the federal republic, to the effect that these persons were not spies from the East, but rather persons who opposed Adenauer. In this manner, the HVA was to underscore the political line of the SED. I shall cite an example. In about 1952, a former farmer, one Heinz Julius Schroder, who at that time was a resident of the village of Passow in Kreis Angermunde, defected to West Germany. The SED had ferreted out an armed resistance group in this village of which Schroder was a member. Subsequently, Schroder became active in politics in the federal republic. He became Kreis business agent of the CDU in Reutlingen/Tuttlingen. However, he violated the trust placed in him and committed a number of acts of embezzlement. When he could no longer maintain his position, he returned to East Berlin as a 'political refugee.' This person was then used to substantiate the SED version of the alleged blow, struck by CDU party chairman Doctor Adenauer, against alleged opposition within his own party. It was suggested to Schroder that he also had been a member of this opposition within the CDU and was only able to avert his arrest at the last minute by fleeing to East Germany.

"On orders from Walter Ulbricht, Major General Marcus Wolf, who was the chief of the HVA, ordered two collaborators of Office II -- CDU/CSU to 'process' Julius Schroder. He was scheduled to be presented over the radio and on television as a victim of CDU internal differences. Articles were written for him; television interviews were staged for him; and he was finally presented to a press conference. His embezzlements were 'hushed up.' The SED interest in Schroder went so far that the department chief for agricultural questions in the Central Committee, one Wagner, took a personal interest, equipped Schroder with a villa in Berlin-Blankenburg, and appointed him to the position of editor of the newspaper Freier Bauer. Under supervision of the HVA, Schroder then made trips throughout the GDR. At that time he was being passed off as a representative of opposition agricultural circles in the federal republic. The citizens of his former home village, Passow, were surprised to find that the former agent and resistance fighter, who had fought against the GDR, was now a 'German patriot.'

"In addition, one should say that the HVA is intensely interested in visitors who arrive from the federal republic. It has developed a methodology for this purpose. There are many cases in which entry permits for citizens of the federal republic who wish to visit relatives in the GDR are issued with the proviso that the person concerned accept intelligence functions. In this connection, special emphasis must be placed on the Leipzig Trade Fair."

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B. Lieutenant Gunter Gebauer

Gunter Gebauer was born in 1931 and has been a collaborator of the SSD since the end of 1951. On 1 July 1952, he became a first sergeant at the Kreis office of the Ministry of State Security in Kamenz. He remained there until the end of the year, working on police sojourn permits and requests for interzonal travel. Later, he was transferred to the position of deputy political chief of the machine-tractor station in Kamenz. In the meantime, he had attended the SSD school in Berlin Orankesee. On 17 June 1953, he was again active at the Kreis office in Kamenz. In 1954, he was transferred to the Bezirk Administration in Dresden and placed in charge of an office dealing with the Sorb minority. On 13 February 1956, upon the suggestion of the personnel department of the Ministry of State Security, he was dispatched to attend the school for middle cadres in Teterow. After successful conclusion of this course in September 1956, he was promoted to lieutenant and assigned to Department V in Dresden to deal with so-called ideological diversion "carried on by enemies of the GDR against the state apparatus." In this capacity, he also worked on the CDU-East. At the beginning of 1958, he was relieved and transferred to Department IX--Investigations. Until his defection in the summer of 1959, he was in charge of office V/6--Youth and Sports. Gebauer reports the following, inter alia:

"In the middle of 1958, the SED installed a monitoring device in the office of Protestant Bishop Noth in Dresden. The installation was supervised by the chief of the Bezirk Administration, whereas the technical progress of the installation was entrusted to Major Winkel, Chief of Department O--Technology. Senior Lieutenant Loffler, who at that time was in charge of the Office of Church Affairs of the Bezirk Administration, was also interested in the installation of the device.

"The affair proceeded as follows: Senior Lieutenant Loffler requested the installation of a monitoring device with the justification that 'in the Protestant church, there is an insufficient number of informants; therefore, we need other sources of information regarding the activities of the church.' Contact was made with a stoker who worked at the Land Church and who had at one time volunteered his services as an informant. The stoker saw to it that the collaborators of the Bezirk Administration gained access to the offices of the Land Church Office at night. In addition, he delivered the contents of waste baskets, which he was expected to burn, to Lieutenant Janicke, whose speciality was the Protestant Church. For his activities, the stoker received sums of money ranging from 100 to 150 DM. He gave the Bezirk Administration the opportunity to have pass keys made for all rooms in the Land Church Office. Thus, it was possible, to install the small monitoring device directly in the telephone connection of the bishop's private telephone and to run the line to the office of



Lieutenant Janicke. At that office, the telephone conversations were recorded on tape and later evaluated. The Ministry of State Security was able to utilize this source of information for almost a year, until a Western publication brought the matter to a halt (Note: Report of the Investigations Committee of Free Jurists, dated 24 September 1959).

"Main Department V of the Ministry of State Security contains an office V/6--Youth and Sports. It is under the command of Major Butter and deals with schools, universities, youth organizations, the FDJ, the GST, and all juveniles who are not members of any organization.

"All Bezirks have a similar office in their SSD Administrations for local juveniles. I was active in one such office in Dresden and in 1959 was assigned to pay special attention to so-called juvenile groups and rowdiness.

"It had lately been determined that juvenile crime had increased, and it was suspected that the groups of juveniles, which were cropping up everywhere, had a political backing. That is to say, it was assumed that Western intelligence services were using the youth in order to create disturbances aimed against the FDJ and the GDR. The situation was such that we, in our Bezirk Administration for the Dresden area, were expected to cover all of these youth groups. Primarily as a result of the prohibition to perform Western type dance music, a number of groups had formed and were calling themselves 'Mambo Club,' 'Rock-and-Roll Club,' etc. The Ministry of State Security had designated these groups as enemies of the state and demanded that they be covered and destroyed with the assistance of the FDJ. For this purpose, we of Department V/6 were expected to visit the individual Kreis offices, collect information there regarding the character of these youth groups, and prepare an analysis for presentation to Fritz Reuter, First Secretary of the SED Bezirk Headquarters; he then determined certain counter-measures, such as, for example, the organization of 'Youth Forums.' These affairs were sponsored by the FDJ, and we were present as secret observers. We observed the juveniles and noted all those who expressed themselves against the FDJ and its program. These persons were later checked and, in the event there were grounds for suspicion, were further processed by the Ministry. This whole campaign was called the fight against 'Anti-FDJ Disturbances.'

"Even the FDJ itself was and is observed by Department V/6 to a certain extent. Every major event which transgresses the boundaries of a Bezirk is first announced in a ministerial order (Colonel General Mielke), and measures are stipulated which the Ministry of State Security has to take to arrange for the security of the event. These measures primarily include the checking of participants. The Ministry of State Security demands that all FDJ groups which travel to events in other regions include unofficial collaborators, that is, informants. If this is not possible, then one of the participants is to be recruited as an unofficial collaborator or such a collaborator must be clandestinely installed within the group.



"Let us take the example of the World Youth Festival of 1959. Several FDJ delegates were scheduled to travel to Vienna from Dresden. First, we of Department V/6 had a secret conversation with the secretaries of the FDJ Bezirk Headquarters for Dresden. It was stipulated that at least one tenth of the delegates had to be unofficial collaborators of our ministry. For Dresden, this meant two informants. Thereafter, those delegates who were appointed by the FDJ were checked for "cadre" type information. This means that their past political activities were subject to examination, as were their contacts, and information was solicited from local informants or from the police regarding the decorum of the particular youth.

"After the delegation for Bezirk Dresden had been finally agreed upon, the ministry was able to give up its plans to install new informants in the delegation because three unofficial collaborators had been proposed by the FDJ. One of these, a so-called principal informant, was charged with directing the other informants and with establishing contacts with the other secret principal informants of the total GDR delegation. Actual officials of the Ministry of State Security were not sent to Vienna.

"By the way of another example, the FDJ organized its Sixth Parliament and Youth Festival in Rostock in 1959. Both of these events occasioned ministerial orders. Informants had to be installed in both the parliament delegation and the delegation to the Youth Festival. Actual operating officials of the Ministry of State Security did travel to Rostock to secure the event right on the spot. They reported to Department V/6 later.

"An important field of activity for the Ministry of State Security in Dresden is represented by the Advanced Technical School with its approximately 20,000 students. Currently, approximately 250 informants are active at the school. In the opinion of the chiefs of the Bezirk Administration for Dresden, this number is still much too low. The informant net is supposed to be at least doubled. It is planned to build so-called groups of secret informants or residencies, that is, groups of informants numbering about ten men and under the control of one principal informant, at the school. In this manner, the staff of operating officials of the Ministry of State Security can be kept small, and the network of informants can be expanded at will. Assistants of the Advance Technical School are used as principal informants on a preference basis.



"A large part of the activity of Department V, particularly of Office 6, is in sports, resulting primarily from the exchange of delegations within the framework of the all-German sports traffic. This traffic is considered to be a great source of danger because it is possible for GDR sports personnel, through impressions they gain in the federal republic and through the influences to which they are exposed in their travels in the West, to be diverted from the current lines of GDR policy. They later become, as one is wont to say, ideological opponents of the GDR. This is very important in connection with tourism, particularly in regard to mountain climbers. The Ministry of State Security suspects that mountain climbers are installing arms caches and contact locations in the Sachsische Schweiz on orders of Western intelligence services. Because of this suspicion, efforts are under way to create an informant net within groups of mountain climbers. Thus far, several informants have been successfully placed, but an informant leader is still lacking. It is no easy matter to find such a person in this kind of group who might be above suspicion among his fellow sportsmen.

"Let us return to the all-German sport contacts. Ministerial orders have been issued to devote special attention to the creation of an informant net in all phases of the enterprise sport associations. Every sports association must contain at least one informant who can report in detail on the course of a trip to the federal republic and possibly also on the behavior of individual participants. If one such report contains information that, let us say, a member of a soccer team had made unsupervised contacts in West Germany, then this sportsman is placed under surveillance by a special group from his Kreis SSD office and later processed in more detail. If the primary information points to enemy contacts, attempts are first made to win the sportsman over to collaboration with the Ministry of State Security; if these are not successful, criminal proceedings are instituted against him."

C. Interrogator in Chemnitz

Ulrich Mikunas was born in 1931. He last occupied the position of an SSD lieutenant. His father, an old Communist, was murdered by the Nazis in a concentration camp. Ulrich Mikunas attended secondary school and began a commercial career which he did not complete. In 1948-1949, he attended the Mining School and later the Mining Academy at Freiberg in Saxony. He passed an examination as a blast technician at the German-Soviet "Wismut" company in Johanngeorgenstadt. On 1 March 1952, he joined the transport police. At the beginning of 1953, he was assigned to the Central School of the transport police in Nordhausen. He underwent a weapons training and marksmanship course, as well as an officer candidate course. He became an instructor in weapons and marksmanship technology and held the rank of a company commander in Chemnitz. At one time, he also commanded the train escort group of the "Wismut" Company.



In the middle of 1954, he was asked to become an operating official of the State Security Service. A difference of opinion ensued between the transport police group and the SSD regarding the release of Mikunas. Finally, the transport police ordered Mikunas transferred to the SSD in Chemnitz. He was appointed a junior lieutenant and was placed in charge of security of the railroad shops and rail facilities in Chemnitz-Hilbersdorf. He maintained surveillance over approximately 1,500 persons there. In 1955, he attended an SSD course in Chemnitz and, following the successful conclusion of the course in September, was assigned as an interrogator to Department IX (Investigations) of the Bezirk Administration. He remained in this position until the end of 1956, at which time he was called to Berlin by Colonel Bormann. In the fall of 1959, Mikunas defected to the federal republic. The following is a report by Mikunas:

"When I was working in the Bezirk Administration in Chemnitz, we had 13-14 interrogators who were constantly busy. Naturally, there were also times when we had only two prisoners in investigative custody, and so the interrogators also had to engage in other activities. We were especially trained for our work. In a special course, we were taught the basic concepts of state and legal provisions; we learned criminal trial provisions and practiced 'interrogation techniques.' Each week, every Bezirk Administration had special training sessions for concentrating on questions of investigative work. The average age of the interrogators is somewhere between 20 and 45 years of age. As a junior lieutenant, specialist (which was the normal job), I was drawing 900 DM-East net [per month?]. Added to this was 60 DM subsistence allowance and an additional quarters allowance. In the event one had to live a part from one's family, there was a 15-percent separation differential. An interrogator is not badly paid.

"Let us return to the methods: From the middle of 1955, I was an interrogator with the Investigations Department of the Bezirk Administration in Karl-Marx-Stadt. The methods used in individual investigations and elicitations varied widely. We had to rely mostly on operational material provided by the individual special departments and only in part on the confessions of the accused. Special emphasis was placed on cooperation with so-called room agents (Kammeragenten). This was one of the favored methods used in extracting a confession from an accused during interrogation. After all, every person is interested in misleading the interrogator, and we had individual cells in the investigative custody prison which were specially treated by the Technology Department. In these cells, monitoring devices had been installed and were used to monitor conversations between prisoners. The recordings were made available to the investigations department either in an evaluated form or for replay in front of prisoner in cases in which the investigations proceedings were not going along in a positive manner,



favorable to the GDR. The above is a 'room agent.' There were also live room agents. We frequently had persons under investigation who had been designated as traitors, diversionists, or spies. We had to handle anything that came along. There were times when we had only agitators and persons who slandered the state; at other times, all of our prisoners were diversionists and spies.

"In our interrogations, we collaborated with Department I of the Bezirk State Prosecutors Office. The regulations which we worked by were essentially based on the criminal code and criminal proceedings orders; however, this did not exclude the possibility that in individual interrogations, where no state attorney was present, we used means which would not be reconciled with the official criminal trial proceedings. For example, if we had a prisoner who, in our opinion, behaved absolutely stubbornly, he could be punished with additional arrest although he was already in investigative custody. He would be placed in solitary confinement and receive food only every third day; he would also receive a mattress only every third day. He would always be interrogated before receiving his food. Another example: if, during interrogation, a prisoner does not act the way the interrogator wishes him to act, he is left to stand until he has changed his mind. In such cases, it naturally also happens that threats are pronounced against these prisoners from time to time.

"The investigation official does not have the assignment of eliciting the truth, but must provide proof supporting the accusations made against the prisoner. It was preached (I repeat, preached) that the innocence of an accused was to be proven just as much as his possible guilt. However, this was a purely theoretical point.

"The situation is such in SSD investigative custody that various other possibilities are to be ferreted out. Each arrest is conducted in a clandestine manner, that is, no warrant is issued against the accused. The judicial authorities are not notified of the arrest. Similarly, relatives of the person arrested are given no information. The accused simply disappears. No one is permitted, upon oath, to speak of these things. As to the other possibilities, attempts are made to win over every arrested person if the person shows any kind of promise in line with SSD functions. A person having potential for the SSD is characterized roughly as follows: one with connections to West Germany or connections to persons whom it is normally difficult to approach; the latter can include church circles or political parties of the Soviet Bloc. In such cases, attempts will be made to urge the prisoner to collaborate with the SSD 'through the back door.' He is told that he can evade punishment in this manner. In other words, pressure is exerted.



"I would like to describe the process. The prisoner is told: "Here you are, in the investigative custody prison. You have seen that we are serious. We are not interested in keeping you here 3 months, 4 months, or longer and then turning you over to the courts for appropriate punishment. You can remedy your error in a different way by doing something for us, about which naturally no one else must find out." Most of the prisoners are so depressed by their incarceration that they avail themselves of this opportunity. However, there is another method. Persons who have already been sentenced and who, during investigative custody, have made contact with persons who are stubborn, are recruited as room agents. They are told that their sentences will be reduced and, after they have signed a contract, are kept in the investigative custody prison illegally. They receive special privileges, better food, cigarettes, newspapers, and a radio. Once each week they are transferred to a new cell, that is, to cells occupied by prisoners from who information is required. These agents make written reports on their experiences and on information which they have elicited. Criminal characters are also utilized for this kind of activity.

"If I am investigating a prisoner and preliminary results lead to the conclusion that he might be suitable for utilization in the West, I must notify the appropriate special department chief of the Bezirk Administration and give him the opportunity of speaking with the prisoner. This usually ends with the signing of a secrecy agreement which refers to Paragraph 353 of the Criminal Code. The agreement states that the undersigned new informant agrees to work for the Ministry of State Security; a violation of his secrecy agreement is punishable in accordance with Paragraph 353. The violation of the agreement is said to result in a severe prison sentence, regardless of the fact that no official use could be made of the agreement. There has not been a single case in which a person has been prosecuted in court for violating the secrecy agreement because his unofficial activity in behalf of the SSD is in no way legal. The secrecy agreement is only used as a means of exerting pressure, since it is anticipated that the outsider is not informed about legal conditions and does not know that he can virtually not be prosecuted."

#### IX. AGITATION AND PROPAGANDA

(From testimony of a former propagandist of the Ministry of State Security)

"I was active in the Department for Agitation of the Ministry of State Security from the end of 1956 through the end of 1958 and accompanied mobile exhibits throughout the GDR. Until August 1957, this department was headed by Colonel Bormann. He was pensioned because of ill health and was succeeded by Major Halle. At the beginning of my



activity in this department, I accompanied an exhibit entitled 'Spies, Agents, and Saboteurs Unmasked' throughout the GDR. My first experience was in Greifswald in connection with the 500-year celebration of the local university. We had shown a number of examples of the activity of Western secret services and the so-called 'underground organizations' to the public. These were operations which had been liquidated by the Ministry of Security or by the People's Police within the GDR. Among others, they included the balloon campaigns started by the SPD (German Social Democratic Party) East Bureau and other organizations for the purpose of disseminating propaganda material. It was explained to us at the time that the ministry conducted these exhibits primarily to show the population the methods by which the Western 'secret services' intend to change the 'cold war' into a 'hot war.' It was intended to scare the population and to influence it against having anything to do with leaflets or other objects of so-called enemy propaganda.

"Simultaneously, the large number of exhibits was to create the impression that the Ministry of State Security was omnipresent and could not be deceived by anything. Thus, it was hoped that a previously planned purpose could be achieved, namely, the recruitment of new secret collaborators for the various departments of the ministry. For this reason, the Bezirk Administration in whose area we happened to be showing the exhibit made operational collaborators available who participated in the exhibit and who, on the basis of information made available to them by the exhibit management or through us propagandists, approached people who appeared to be suitable for collaboration. Every exhibit, therefore, also had a special room for conducting conversations and for signing collaboration agreements. Let us return to the exhibition. The exhibit included balloons which the ministry had designated as espionage balloons. One such balloon was equipped with a camera which hung in a special harness. The balloon measured about 70 meters in height and 55 meters in diameter. Its total weight was about 650 kilograms.

"We received directives according to which we were to point out that these instruments could certainly not serve for weather research purposes. We were told to say that they were espionage equipment used to make aerial photographs from great altitudes and relay the pictures by radio to a point on the ground, thus permitting them [the enemy?] to conduct reconnaissances of key areas and, in case of war, be able to strike immediately. We were also told that the balloons contained a highly sensitive explosive which was to be exploded by radio in case the balloon came to earth in a socialist country. This would have been all very well if it had been true, and even I would have believed that these were espionage instruments, since it appeared unnecessary to equip a weather instrument with an explosive charge. But neither my colleagues nor I found any such explosive charge in these instruments. There was not even a place in the balloon which could have housed an explosive charge.



I know that the balloon was scientifically examined, since we showed our exhibit in cities which housed universities and advanced schools. It often happened, for example, in Jena, that scientists contradicted the statements which we had to make. For instance, we were told to say that the instrument was surrounded with an antiradar device made of aluminum foil. The aluminum foil was suppose to mislead the ground facilities of an enemy. Actually, as scientists in Jena were able to prove to us, this was a weather sonde which is sent aloft in a small balloon and carries appropriate instruments.

"Frequently, children or adults brought these aluminum foil kites and weather instruments to us. They usually bore the following inscription: 'The finder of this weather sonde is requested to send it to the weather station in Hamburg.' Our whole argument then was shattered. Nevertheless, we were forced to continue using it. In addition, camera specialists in Jena proved to us that one cannot make satisfactory photographs with a camera having a focal length of 53 centimeters from the given height of 12,000 meters. After this incident in Jena, Colonel Bormann was forced to analyze the balloon once more with his instruments. The analysis proved beyond any doubt that it was a weather balloon. Nevertheless, we had to maintain our original stand.

"The following is another example of propaganda activity. In one exhibit, we were showing material covering the activity of a Russian emigre organization referred to as the NIS (National Association of Workers). This organization was to be depicted in a discriminatory and criminal way. Part of the exhibit dealt with the actions of a Soviet national, one Pavel Krawez, alias Sokorin. This person had allegedly been dropped by parachute from an American military aircraft over USSR territory. We had some 'substantiating evidence,' including long-range radio instruments, batteries, forged personal documents, stamps, pistols, ammunition, drugs, a sleeping bag, and ample food supplies. It was virtually impossible to drop all of these things, including the 'agent,' with one parachute. It was claimed that Sokorin had jumped with two spare radio sets and a bag of spare parts. Shortly after he landed, he was allegedly picked up by soviet security forces. Apart from the equipment which was designated as 'original equipment,' there was no evidence of the incident. It was peculiar that these 'original items of equipment' were available in triplicate and quadruplicate and were shown in varying exhibits at the same time. The agent was obviously a magician.

"The Agitation Department also dealt with other matters. For example, it made propagandists available where unrest had been created in an enterprise as a result of certain events which occurred there or as a result of arrests which were made there. On such occasions, a propagandist was sent to an enterprise meeting, gave a speech, and presented "evidence." The material was prepared in special laboratories and workshops of the Agitation Department, and the speech for such events was delivered to



the propagandists 2 days in advance. In the laboratories and workshops, which incidentally also included studios for radio, motion-picture, and television programs, documentary films for use in various propaganda campaigns against the federal republic were also produced. It is probable that the documentary material for films such as "Operation Teutonic Sword" and the Diary of Anne Frank" was produced in this manner. (Note: Both are allegedly documentary films containing political propaganda aimed against the Federal Republic of Germany)."

#### X. AN FDJ SECRETARY AND THE STATE SECURITY SERVICE

In a large enterprise in Magdeburg, a 19-year-old juvenile was appointed to the position of FDJ Secretary for 1,200 youths in 1958. He is a turner by profession, has been a member of the FDJ for the last 5 years, and has shown a positive attitude in various actions and campaigns conducted by the SED regime. For a period of 18 months, he carried out his function more or less to the satisfaction of the next higher officials. He gained insight, was able to recognize political and economic matters, and drew some conclusions from studying the errors of the SED regime. Following a 3-month course in an FDJ school, he returned to the enterprise, not as a convinced FDJ official, but as a doubter. On the occasion of a conference of delegates in his enterprise, he expressed his doubt and posed the question as to whether it was really possible to explain all phases of life ideologically or not.

For himself and for a few friends whose names he mentioned, he denied the totalitarian claims of ideology. An FDJ disciplinary proceeding followed; he was summoned to the Bezirk chairmanship in Magdeburg and had to explain his actions and engage in self-criticism. His application for membership in the SED, which he had filled out for "opportunistic reasons," was rejected. He lost his position following the self-criticism, which was designated as inadequate, and had to return to working at the lathe. Only 14 days later, he was approached by a representative of the SSD in his own apartment. This man called himself Hase and told the young man that he has much to atone for and would, therefore, have to serve the security organs of the worker and peasant state as a convinced socialist. The SSD collaborator gave him some time to think it over, reappearing in 10 days. He asked the young man to conduct investigations regarding suspected Western contacts of individual members of his own brigade, which the SSD Security Service has designated as a center of unrest; in addition to this, the young man was requested to report on whether members of the brigade read Western publications, smoke Western cigarettes, and have traveled frequently to West Berlin.



The young man did not want to do this; he was threatened with criminal proceeding (supplemental criminal law of the GDR) and told that his mother's pension, which she receives because her husband died in a concentration camp as a victim of fascism, can be taken away from her. Under this type of pressure, the young man appeared to relent, attempted to bluff his way through, writing a few innocuous reports, and finally, in an effort to escape from the snare, took an overdose of sleeping tablets. He was forced to stay in the hospital for 12 weeks and later spend 3 weeks in a Thuringian convalescent home run by the social insurance agency. Upon his return, he was again approached by the SSD. He was asked to resume his activity in the enterprise or to find another job. In place of an answer, the young man packed a suitcase and, accompanied by his mother, defected to West Berlin.

#### XI. RECRUITING OF AGENTS WITH DECEPTIVE MATERIAL

In the last few years the SSD has repeatedly attempted, on the basis of newspaper advertisements appearing in federal republic newspapers (positions vacant), with the use of cover addresses and cover designations, to establish contacts. The victims, for the most part, usually do not detect the deception until they visit East Berlin. As a result of systematic action, the following East Berlin addresses have become known:

Department for Work and Professional Training (Abteilung fur Arbeit und Berufsausbildung), Berlin-Kopenick, Friedrichshagener Strasse 8;

Office for Work and Professional Training (Amt fur Arbeit und Berufsausbildung), Berlin C 2, Georgenkirchplatz 10, and Berlin C 2, Elisabethstrasse 29;

Anker Publishing House, Berlin W, Post Office Box 165;

Attorney and Notary Helmut Armand, Berlin N 24, Post Office Box 19;

Berlin Press Reports, Berlin N 58, Post Office Box 5;

Vocational Consultations Bureau (Berufsberatungsburo -- BBB), Berlin W 8, Post Office Box 165, and Berlin N 54, Post Office Box 14;

Paul Braune & Co., Berlin W 8, Post Office Box 133;

German Picture and Document Collection, Dresden N, Industrial park and Berlin representative, Berlin W 8, Post Office Box 139;

Exclusive Reports "Exna Greater-Berlin," Berlin W 63, Post Office Box 23;

Walter Gerber, Berlin, Prenzlauer Berg, Oderberger Strasse 1;



Mark Home Service (Maerkischer Heimatdienst), Berlin NW 63, Post Office Box 23;

Dr Schmidt, Berlin NW 63, Post Office box 11;

Employment Office Limited (Stellenvermittlungsburo), Berlin W 8, Post Office Box 165;

Administration for Ship Construction Problems (Verwaltung fuer Schiffsbaufragen), Berlin-Prenzlauer Berg, Oderberger Str. 1;

Central Research Office (Zentralamt fuer Forschungs), Berlin N 24, Post Office Box 30.

## XII. EXAMPLES FROM THE WORK OF THE SOVIET INTELLIGENCE SERVICE

To illustrate the activities of the SSD (State Security Service), two additional examples from the work of the Soviet Intelligence Service are listed. The Soviet Intelligence Service usually uses the SSD, but does not inform it of its own activities. In most cases, the collaborators of the Soviet Intelligence Service are expected to sign a double secrecy agreement; they must not speak of their work to relatives or acquaintances, and they must not speak of their work to GDR authorities.

### A. A 36-Year-Old Person and His Fate

Leo Peter R. was born in Prague. His father was sentenced to death in Czechoslovakia because of collaboration with the Nazis and was executed. The subject himself was a Hitler-Youth leader in Prague and later a member of the general SS. After the war, he settled in Kassel with his mother. He became a member of the Christian Democratic Union. He began correspondence study and, at first, wanted to become an interpreter, but later, a lawyer. In 1947, he terminated his affiliation with the Christian Democratic Union and, establishing a New Citizens Association, ran for office as an independent candidate in the Bundestag elections of 1949. He was unable to obtain the required number of votes, gave up his association, and joined the right-radical National Front. During the same year, Leo Peter R. also became a member of the Socialist Reichsparty and remained a member until the party was disbanded in 1953. In the meantime, he had moved to Ludwigsburg and worked as a commercial clerk and, later, as a representative. His move from Kassel was accomplished under the "influence" of a verdict by the Land court, pronounced against him because of perjury during the Bundestag elections. The 9 month sentence passed upon him was suspended. On 18 June 1954, he was again brought to court for using false documentation and was sentenced to 6 months in jail. Later, he was sentenced to pay a 40-DM fine for insulting the head of a school.



In July 1955, when R. was to begin his prison sentences, he defected to the GDR. An unknown "friend" had told him to report to the East Berlin police presidium. He did this on 21 July 1955. He accepted the offer of asylum made by the GDR authorities and went to Leipzig where he became a payroll clerk in a people-owned enterprise. His family joined him there. On 20 September 1955, a middle-man introduced him to an officer of the Soviet Intelligent Service who was referred to as Captain Svetlov. The latter offered R. the opportunity of working for the Soviet Intelligence Service and demanded, by way of a test, that R. establish contacts with "progressive persons" in the federal republic. R. agreed to this offer, particularly since larger sums of money were involved. He met with Svetlov every 2 weeks and later also met a Major Vassilyv. On 26 January 1956, R. signed a contract which he had drawn up himself and which contained the following clause: "I must not tell any German authorities or individuals about my activities."

In the meantime, GDR authorities had appointed R. to the position of Assistant State's Attorney in Leipzig. At the end of March, however, he resigned from this office and became an interpreter. In addition, he devoted his time to the National Front, especially taking care of visitors from the federal republic. He reported to Captain Svetlov on his conversations. During this time, R. established written contact with three persons in the federal republic. They were a leftist Social Democrat, a former enterprise counselor, and R's cousin. R. invited the leftist official of the SPD to Leipzig and then introduced him to Svetlov. The Soviet Intelligence Service equipped R. with a personal identification document made out to a Doctor Ruediger and sent him to Frankfurt. There, he met the Social Democrat. At the end of October, R. traveled to Munich under the alias of Dr Havemann. Thereafter, the Social Democrat was invited to Leipzig twice more. In the meantime, he had become an employee of the Post Office and brought Captain Svetlov several "interesting items of mail" which he had removed from circulation in the federal republic. He was paid for his services. When R. attempted to establish new contacts in a large city in southern Germany, he was arrested.

#### B. Industrial Espionage

At the end of August 1955, Theodore W. from Berlin-Treptow (Soviet sector) visited Hans S. in Duisburg, under orders of the Soviet Intelligence Service. He saw S. and a machinist Helmut J. for the first time. S. had fled from the GDR where he had engaged in illegal iron trading with his brother until 1951. He had attempted, unsuccessfully, to continue to do business from the federal republic. Until 1955, S. had flown to West Berlin several times to meet his brother. When Theodore W. visited S. in Duisburg, he reminded him of the illegal iron business. After they had conversed, W. indicated that the acceptance of an intelligence assignment by S. could prevent difficulties for S.'s brother and parents. From a secret compartment of his cigarette case, W. removed a



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document which he handed to S. The following sentence was written on the document: "You can lighten your conscience and save your brother and thus offer your old parents a decent life in their old age; you may trust the bearer of this document, and he will explain details to you."

After S. had read the document, W. brought forth a bundle of 50 and 100 DM notes from another cigarette case and offered them to S., obligating him to come to Berlin. He was to appear in Berlin using the pseudonym Ries. S. requested some time to think it over. W. departed. More than a year later, in November 1956 -- S. had remained silent in the meantime -- W. reappeared in the federal republic. He registered in a hotel in Bochum and traveled to Duisburg. In Duisburg, he heard that S. had moved; he finally located him in Muhlheim-Ruhr, spoke to him, and demanded an agreement. S. declined. W. remarked that he would come again at Christmas time. Following this fruitless visit with S., W. went to see Helmut J. in Duisburg, gave him money for a journey to Berlin, and suggested to him that he re-establish his old contacts. He was instructed to call on Max Wirsig in East Berlin.

Theodore W. came to Muhlheim again on 28 December 1956. He visited S. and was arrested by the criminal police. They found almost 1,000 DM-West and 40 DM-East in his possession. In a briefcase which had two secret compartments, there were personal travel gear and two new albums of poetry. The cover of one was torn open because W. had removed the money and placed it on his person. Within the cover of the other album, there was a typewritten order from the Soviet Intelligence Service. Among other statements, the following was written in the document: "Honored J. and G. We are sending you West marks, with some of which you are to procure a camera, model Adixa-Reflex with a Steinheil-Cassar 2.8 lens. It is fully suitable for the work. It can best be bought on the time purchase plan as a 'present for a son.' Send us undeveloped films in boxes through our friend. You are requested, upon receipt of this report, to write to the new address: Berlin-Koepenick, Gehserstrasse No 72, II Left, Frau Rosa Schwemmer. It is requested that you transmit greetings to Doris and Kurt, daughter and husband of Mrs Schwemmer. As to the question of the production of polyethylene, we are interested in the following: (a) preparation of the catalyst through synthesis within the framework of industrial production (formula scheme of technology, design of apparatus) and (b) method for regulating the molecular weight of polyethylene. You are requested to reply to all questions in secret writing. In the interest of clandestine operations, you should not tell our friend too much about yourselves although you can trust him fully."

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### XIII. Events "Under the Care" of the State Security Service

The following events are observed by the SSD (State Security Service) and utilized for the recruitment of agents:

The spring and the fall fairs at Leipzig; the all-german conferences, meetings, and congresses of organizations, parties and institutions of the GDR, from the all-German Worker Congresses through specialized meetings of, say, teachers, and educators, all entertainment events in which Western artists participate; the Baltic Sea Week which is held each year from the end of June to the beginning of July; the games on the Isle of Ruegen and the worker sports games planned for this year in Bezirk Chemnitz; all types of student meetings and conversations between mercantile agents and industrialists and all types of exhibitions and fairs; sports events in which more than two teams participate, as well as the so-called German Gymnastics and Sports Event (Turn-und Sportfest) scheduled for each August in Leipzig.

The SSD maintains residencies at all of the above events.

Theodore W. came to Munich again on 28 December 1956. He visited B. and was arrested by the criminal police. They found almost 1,000 DM-West and 40 DM-East in his possession. In a briefcase which had two secret compartments, there were personal travel gear and two new albums of poetry. The cover of one was torn open because W. had removed the money and placed it on his person. Within the cover of the other album, there was a typewritten order from the Soviet Intelligence Service. Among other statements, the following was written in the document: "Honored J. and G. We are sending you West marks, with some of which you are to procure a camera, model Adixa-Hellex with a Stalder-Gasser 2.8 lens. It is fully suitable for the work. It can best be bought on the time purchase plan as a 'present for a son.' Send us undeveloped films in boxes through our friend. You are requested, upon receipt of this report, to write to the new address: Berlin-Koepenick, Gehersstrasse No 75, II left, from Hans Schweinert. It is requested that you transmit greetings to Doris and Kurt, daughter and husband of the Schweinert. As to the question of the production of polyethylene, we are interested in the following: (a) preparation of the catalyst through synthesis within the framework of industrial production (formal scheme of technology, design of apparatus) and (b) method for regulating the molecular weight of polyethylene. You are requested to reply to all questions in secret writing. In the interest of clandestine operations, you should not tell our friend too much about yourselves although you can trust him fully."



APPENDIX

A. Glossary of Some Principal Terms

Agent -- Principal figure of the Ministry of State Security who maintains a residence in the GDR or in the Soviet sector of Berlin and supervises the work of various secret principal informants, that is, he supervises an espionage net. Agents are used directly only on the rarest of occasions and are always key figures.

Safe Apartment -- The State Security Service maintains, throughout the GDR and in the Soviet sector of Berlin, several hundred apartments which are used as contact places by secret collaborators and secret informants, places to which mail is directed and where agents can rendezvous with principal informants. The owners of the apartments are usually themselves collaborators of the State Security Service. In many cases, however, the apartments are owned by fictitious persons.

Contact Paper -- A chemically processed type of paper which can be written upon with selected ink and which, later, shows no signs of having been written upon since the writing is a so-called latent writing which does not become visible until the recipient treats the paper with certain chemical substances.

Residency -- A small specialized headquarters created in selected organizations, institutions, or enterprises. Several informants in one area are joined in one residency. There are legal and illegal residencies. Legal residencies are those which are established within the GDR in the presidiums of the party and mass organizations and are called West Departments. Illegal residencies are usually located outside of the GDR in parties, organizations, or enterprises of the federal republic. Each residency is directed by a principal informant, and the individual members of the residency are not acquainted with one another. Frequently, the SSD asks for one resident to observe another.

Deadletter Drops -- These are installations for the transmission of information in a "simple way." Favorite locations are in trees, fences, cemeteries, railroad cars (under the seats of a selected compartment), etc. A resident receives an order from his principal informant calling for the establishment of a deadletter drop at a certain place, which is then "serviced" on a regular basis by the principal informant or his courier. All information, films, or other materials are then deposited in the deadletter drops. Thus, the principal informant only rarely contacts his collaborators directly. When the collaborator does not receive any orders via the radio or through coded letter, he receives them through deadletter drops. The SSD also uses deadletter drops within the territory of the GDR.



B. Abbreviations

CDU -- Christlich-Demokratische Union, Christian Democratic Union

CSU -- Christlich-Soziale Union, Christian Social Union

DFB -- Deutscher Frauenbund, German League of Women

DIA -- Deutscher Innen-und Aussenhandel, Inter-German and Foreign Trade Organization

FDGB -- Freier Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund, Free German Trade Unions Federation

FDJ -- Freie Deutsche Jugend, Free German Youth

GHI -- Geheimer Hauptinformator, Secret Principal Informant

GI -- Geheimer Informator, Secret Informant

GM -- Geheimer Mitarbeiter, Secret Collaborator

GST -- Gesellschaft fuer Sport und Technik, Association for Sports and Technology [the GDR paramilitary organization]

HVA -- Hauptverwaltung Aufklaerung, Main Administration for Intelligence

HVDVP -- Hauptverwaltung der Deutschen Volkspolizei, Main Administration for the German People's Police

LDP -- Liberal-Demokratische Partei, Liberal Democratic Party

MfS -- Ministerium fuer Staatssicherheit, Ministry of State Security

NDP -- National-Demokratische Partei, National Democratic Party

PS -- Parteischule, Party School

SED -- Sozialistische Einheitspartei, Socialist Unity of Germany Party

SPD -- Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands, Social Democratic Party of Germany

SSD -- Staatssicherheitsdienst, State Security Service

ZR -- Zentralrat, Central Council

ZK -- Zentralkomitee, Central Committee

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- 48 -



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37